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LLC MEMBER AND LIMITED PARTNER BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS: DIRECT OR DERIVATIVE ACTIONS?
by
James R. Burkhard*
In a breach offiduciary duty claim by a limitedpartneror LLC member against
a generalpartner or manager, courts must decide whether to permit the claim
to be pursued directly or whether to require that it be brought derivatively. This
Article argues in favor of permitting a limited partner or LLC member in a
closely held business to pursue the claim directly. Permittinga direct cause of
action helps limited partnersand non-managingLLC members cut through the
procedural requirements of a derivative action, which often keep the plaintiff
from getting to the merits of the claim. The Article discusses how courts have
determined whether a claim is direct or derivative in this context, outlines an
argument and case history in support of permitting direct claims, and then
proceeds in Part II to advocate the approach outlined in section 7.01(d) of the
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance.
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THE PROBLEM

Imagine your client invests in a restaurant owned by Mrs. Chef. The
restaurant is organized as an LLC with your client and Mrs. Chef as the only
owners. For some unknown reason, after taking your client's money and
investing it in more equipment for the business, Mrs. Chef locks your client out
of the business and transfers all of the equipment purchased with your client's
funds to another business in which your client has no ownership interest.' What
remedies are available to your client? Specifically, can your client directly sue
Mrs. Chef for her obvious breach of fiduciary duty?
This Article focuses on the ability, or sometimes inability, of the limited
partner or LLC member in a closely held business 2 to pursue a direct action
against a general partner or manager who has misappropriated business
property, made an improper profit in selling assets to the closely held business,
usurped a business opportunity, or otherwise breached a fiduciary
improperly
3
duty.

A major hurdle in pursuing a breach of fiduciary claim is that the
defendant(s) will argue that the claim must be brought as a derivative action. If
the claim must be pursued derivatively, this will create serious problems for the
plaintiff. The LLC member or limited partner will be required to overcome a
myriad of procedural requirements, which makes it very difficult, if not
impossible, for a plaintiff to get to the merits of the claim.
A.

Applying Limited PartnershipJurisprudencein the LLC Context

Most of the cases and authorities in this Article involve limited
partnerships. The practical reason is that there are still few reported LLC
decisions. The more important theoretical reason is that the LLC, at least for
the issues considered in this Article, is most similar and possibly identical to
The facts in this example are based on the recent case, Gee v. Bullock, CA No. 962223, 1996 WL 937009 (R.I. Super. Nov. 16, 1996).
2 For purposes of this analysis, a closely held business will be defined as one which
files a partnership tax return and whose interests are not publicly traded.
3 Whether the behavior is or is not a fiduciary breach, is a topic beyond the scope of
this Article. There are a number of articles which have considered whether behavior should
establish a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Charles W. Murdock,
Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the 1990s: Legislative and Case Law
Developments and Their Implicationsfor the Future, 56 Bus. LAW. 499 (2001) (including a
helpful state-by-state chart of statutorily imposed fiduciaries' duties at Appendix 3, page
577); Carter G. Bishop & Daniel S. Kleinberger, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES-TAX AND
BusINEss LAW, Chapter 10 Fiduciary Duty (2001); Sandra K Miller, What Buy-Out Rights,
FiduciaryDuties, andDissolutionRemedies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner
of a Limited Liability Company?, 38 HARV. J. ON LEG. 413 (2001); Kenneth M. Jacobson,
Fiduciary Duty Considerations in Choosing Between Limited Partnerships and Limited
Liability Companies, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1 (2001); J. Mark Meinhardt, Investor
Beware: Protection of Minority Stakeholder Interests in Closely Held Limited-Liability
Business Organizations:Delaware Law and its Adherents, 40 WASHBURN L. J. 288 (2001)
(collecting many secondary sources).
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the limited partnership. Although many LLCs will more directly resemble
general partnerships in regard to "control," manager-run LLCs and those with
dominant managing members more directly resemble the limited partnership.
More importantly, the financial structure of the LLC is identical with that of a
limited partnership and (for purposes of this Article) hardly different from a
general partnership. LLC members and limited partners will suffer the same
type of injury when those in control breach a fiduciary duty owed to these
owners. Courts increasingly, in breach of fiduciary duty claims, refer to LLCs
as "joint ventures. ' 4 The members themselves, particularly in a membermanaged LLC, typically view themselves as "partners." 5 None other than the
Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that the LLC is very similar to the
limited partnership 6 (however, the Delaware Supreme Court has likewise often
stated that for purposes of determining whether a limited partner's claim is
direct or derivative, one should look to corporate law-a conclusion that this
Article disputes in many regards). A federal district court reminds us that
because an LLC can be similar to either a partnership or corporation, it is
necessary to determine how the members have structured their particular LLC
in order to determine how disputes among and between members should be

4 Lynch Multimedia Corp. v. Carson Communications, L.L.C., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1261
(D. Kan. 2000) ("The parties were involved in a joint venture limited liability company
(CLR Video)."); BGJ Assocs., LLC, v. Super. Ct., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 696-97 (Cal. App.
1999) ("The basic theory of plaintiffs' action is that Brittan, Goldman, and Janger formed
BGJ [an LLC] as a joint venture to buy certain real properties ....
");
Indust. Elecs. Corp. v.
iPower Distribution Group, Inc., 215 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2000) (referring to the LLC as
the "association" of the members).
5 See, e.g., BGJ Assocs., LLC, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 698 (Cal. App. 1999) ("Brittan,
Goldman, and Janger agreed among themselves to 'be equal partners and proceed with the
transaction.' They agreed: (A) they would form a limited liability company for the purpose
of entering the purchase agreement ....); Bowman v. SP Pharmaceuticals, L.L.C., 242 F.3d
387 (10th Cir. 2000) (referring to the parties as "partners" even though it would appear that
they were, if not in fact members of an LLC, at least de facto members); Maas Tech., Inc. v.
Henning, 744 So. 2d 238 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (referring to the members as partners and
noting plaintiff's allegations that defendant acted in his capacity as a partner).
6 Elf Atochem, Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 1999) (stating that the Delaware
LLC Act is modeled on Delaware LP Act and its architecture and much of its wording is
almost identical to that of the LP Act; noting that LLC member is treated like a limited
partner and that policy of freedom of contract underlies both Acts). Compare Trademark
Retail, Inc. v. Apple Glen Investors, LP, 196 F.R.D. 535, 539 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (citing
Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998), for the proposition that an LLC is
similar to a limited partnership, but then applying corporate principles because the LLC may
be more like an S corporation); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 762 (West 1996) (stating that
all references to limited partnerships in Maine statutes shall be deemed to include LLCs); cf.
Poore v. Fox Hollow Enters., No. C.A. 93A-09-005, 1994 WL 150872 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar.
29, 1994) (holding that like a corporation, an LLC is a distinct, artificial entity and nonlawyer member cannot represent it); Leigh A. Bacon, 'Freedom Of" or 'Freedom From'
The Enforceability of Contracts and the Integrity of the LLC, 50 DuKE L. J. 1087 (2001)
(discussing whether the LLC form is more similar to a partnership or corporation).
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resolved.7 At least one court has questioned
whether partnership law should be
8

applied to disputes involving LLCs.
B.

The ProceduralHurdles ImposedIn a Derivative Action

The injured LLC member or partner almost always wants to avoid
bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim as a derivative action. Why is this so?
Although a discussion of all the problems a plaintiff faces in attempting to
pursue a derivative action is beyond the scope of this Article, 9 the following
examples briefly highlight some of the difficulties. 10 The few benefits which11
the derivative suit provides are greatly overridden by these disadvantages.
7 Cogniplex, Inc. v. Ross, No. 00 C 7463, 00 C 7933, 2001 WL 436210, at *13 (N.D.
I11.Apr. 27, 2001).
LLCs have both corporate and partnership characteristics. Whether the relations among
members resemble a partnership more than a corporation, or vice-versa, is left largely to
the discretion of the individual organizers. This fluidity can complicate basic questions
such as whether members have contracted with each other. Co-shareholders are, after
all, not contractually bound to each other unless express contracts exist such as a voting
trust. Partnerships, by contrast, bind partners to each other in a contract of mutual
agency. Whichever principle applies to the instant situation depends on how the parties
structured their organization.
Id. Compare TrademarkRetail, 196 F.R.D. at 539 (recognizing that there is authority that an
LLC is similar to a limited partnership but essentially concluding that it is more like an S
corporation).
8 Agincourt, L.L.C. v. Stewart (In re Lake Country Invs.), Nos. 99-20287, 00-6064,
2001 WL 26475, at *10 (Bankr. D. Idaho, Mar. 19, 2001) (stating that cases applicable to
partnerships and construing partnership law were of limited utility because (a) they dealt
with partnerships, not LLCs, and (b) the cited cases dealt with concealed wrongful behavior,
which did not occur in the LLC dispute under consideration).
9 For an additional discussion of the procedural issues, see Daniel S. Kleinberger &
Imanta Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or "What s a Lawsuit Between Friends in an
YncorporatedPartnership'?"22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1203 (1996); CARTER G. BISHOP &
DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES-TAX AND BusINEss LAW
10.01
10.07 Derivative Litigation (2001); see also Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause
of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW. 699, 730 (1993) (discussing derivative suits in the
close corporation context).
10 See Brown v. Brown, 731 A.2d 1212, 1217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
Because of the difficulty in determining if a suit must be brought as a direct or a
derivative action, an increasing number of courts are abandoning the distinction
between a derivative and a direct action because the only interested parties are the two
sets of shareholders. Furthermore, some courts have recognized that it is often difficult
and futile to bring a derivative action against a closely held corporation. As explained
by one authority, "[e]ven if a minority shareholder overcomes procedural hurdles in a
derivative action, a strong disadvantage is that any recovery accrues to the corporation
and hence remains under the control of the very parties who may have been defendants
in the litigation." 2 O'NEAL AND THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.11
(3d ed.1992).
Id.
1 If the plaintiff brings a direct action, this may permit the defendant to file a
counterclaim, which may be prohibited in derivative suits. The successful derivative plaintiff
may be entitled to an award of attorney fees, almost always prohibited in a similar direct suit.
See, e.g., Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, 562-63 (Ind. 1995).
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Not only must the plaintiff comply with the state's civil rules regarding
derivative suits (often imposing the same requirements found in F.R.C.P.
23.1),12 but he may have to comply with additional statutory rules imposed by

state law.' 3 In many states, the LLC statutes impose statutory requirements for
derivative actions.14 Some of these statutes are based on the requirements found
in the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. 15 In most instances, these state
requirements will be controlling when a diversity action is brought in federal
court. 16 However, what may not be as clear is which state statutes control. What
if the plaintiff resides in New York, the defendant in Connecticut, and the LLC
was formed under Pennsylvania law? Whose law is applied? 17 Unfortunately,
12 FED.

R. CIv. P. 23.1.

In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a
right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association
having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint
shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at
the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiffs share
or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of law, and (2) that the
action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which
it would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the
directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members,
and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the
effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does
not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members
similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association. The action
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of
the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in
such manner as the court directs.
Id.; see also Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Limited Partner's Derivative Suits Under the Revised
Uniform Limited PartnershipAct, 33 VAND. L. REV. 343, 374 (1980) (stating that federal
rules apply in federal court and discussing possible conflict between state and federal
requirements).
13 See, e.g., Blasberg v. Oxbow Power Corp., 934 F. Supp. 21, 24 (D. Mass. 1996)
(noting that defendant requested limited partner's claim be dismissed for failing to allege or
show that the procedural prerequisites for a derivative claim were satisfied).
14 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1001 to 18-1004 (1999). The Uniform
Limited Liability Act derivative provisions are essentially the same as Delaware's and have
been enacted in the following states: HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 428-1101 to 428-1104 (Supp.
2001); 805 ILL .COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 180/40-1 to 180/40 -10 (West Supp. 2002) (providing
that both a member or a transferee who is a substituted member has standing to bring a
derivative action); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-1104 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-1101 to
33-44-1104 (West Supp. 2001.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34A-1101 to 47-34A-1104
(Michie 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3151-3154 (1997); W.VA. CODE §§ 31B-1 1-1101
to 31B-I 1-1104 (1996).
15 UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT (1976) §§ 100 1-1004 (West 1995). Most states have adopted
these provisions without significant modification.
16 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE
ET AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.1.04[2] (3d ed. 1999) (noting that although Kamen dealt
only with the demand requirements, by implication, federal courts should generally look to
state law in resolving similar issues such as who is entitled to sue).
17 See generally P. John Kozyris, The Conflict-of-Laws Aspects of the New American
Business Entity: The Limited Liability Company, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 417, 420 (1995) (noting
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there is little direct guidance on this issue. The Seventh Circuit concluded that
in an action brought in Illinois, Illinois courts would apply the "internal affairs
principle" in its choice-of-law analysis where a corporation (not LLC or limited
partnership) is involved.18 In spite of the parties having elected to be governed
by Ohio law, the court concluded that Illinois would apply Delaware law,
which was where the corporation was organized. 19
The plaintiff almost always must first make a demand, or in some
jurisdictions, demonstrate that a demand would be futile. If a demand is made,
the general partner's or LLC manager's decision not to pursue the action-to
have it dismissed-will often be tested under a business judgment standard
favorable to the defendant. 2 The plaintiff who opts to allege that a demand
would be futile will find itself caught up in complex litigation over just this
question. 2 1 The plaintiff must weave through the maze of demand required or
demand excused requirements, as indicated by a recent unreported Delaware
case in which the court authorized the use of a litigation committee as a method
22
for the defendant general partner to get rid of a claim by a limited partner.
Eight states have statutes which authorize the use of a "litigation committee" to

that all LLC derivative actions brought in California are specifically subject to the California
procedures).
18 Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. 916 F.2d 379, 382 (7th Cir. 1990).
19 Id. at 383 (stating that the shareholder failed to brief the choice-of-law issue and,
although agreement specified Ohio law generally, it did not speak to issues of corporate
governance).
20 Seaford Funding Ltd. P'ship v. M & M Assoc. II, L.P. 672 A.2d 66, 70 (Del. Ch.
1995).
The general partner has the responsibility to decide whether to bring a law suit on
behalf of the partnership ....
When limited partners make demand and the general
partner refuses to pursue the action after informed consideration and in good faith, the
business judgment rule comes into play ....
The plaintiffs' power to maintain the
derivative action is terminated by the refusal .... Therefore, the business judgment rule
is of paramount significance in a derivative action.
General partners may not claim the protection of the business judgment rule when
appearing on both sides of the transaction or when deriving a personal benefit in the
sense of self-dealing. .. . Furthermore, general partners may not use the business
judgment rule as a shield if they are not informed of material information reasonably
available to them before making a business decision. ...
Id.

21 Litman v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., 611 A.2d 12, 17 (Del. Ch. 1992) (holding
that assertions of mismanagement, in the absence of particular statements why demand not
made, are insufficient and that plaintiffs have no standing to pursue the action), dismissed,
Civ. A. No. 12137, 1994 WL 30529 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1994). But see infra note 152
(showing that in LLC and partnership derivative litigation, it may be easier for the plaintiff
to demonstrate "demand is futile" than in the corporate context).
22 Katell v. Morgan Stanley Group, Inc., Civ. A. No. 12343, 1993 WL 205033, at *2-*3
(Del. Ch. June 8, 1993); cf S.B. McLaughlin & Co. v. Cochrane, No. C4-92-2081, 1993 WL
231672, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 29, 1993) (prohibiting defendant from raising defense
that committee established by general partner decided suit was not in best interests), aff'd,
Cochrane v. Tudor Oaks Condominium Project, 529 N.W.2d 429 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
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determine if an LLC derivative action should continue. 23 Even in those states
where the committee is not statutorily created, it will often be possible for the
defendant to establish such a committee pursuant to the terms of the operating

agreement.
The general rule is that the plaintiff must have been a member both at the
time of the cause of action and at the time the suit is brought.24 If the court
concludes that the claim must be brought derivatively and there has been a
transfer of the plaintiffs interest before suit is filed, the defendant has won, no
25
one has standing, and the case must be dismissed. If the member dies before
the action is commenced, different from the corporate context, the estate will be
26
a mere assignee and possibly not a successor member entitled to sue.
Delaware seems to be the only state that has recognized the seriousness of this
problem and now permits an "assignee" of a limited partner or LLC member to
27
bring a derivative claim.
The limited partnership statute has been given
retroactive application. 28 Some commentators

even speculate that in the LLC

23 FLA. STAT. § 608.601(3) (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-803 to 14-11-8-5
(1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 450.4511- .4512 (Lexis 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. §§
79-29-1103 to 79-29-1104 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-8-01(c) (2002); OR. REV. STAT. §
63.801 (1999) (stating that court may stay action during investigation); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 1528n, § 8.12 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2003), incorporating by reference, TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art 5.14 (West 1980 & Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1042 (Michie
1993) (incorporating by reference Virginia corporate litigation committee provisions).
24 UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 1102 (1995) ("Proper Plaintiff').
In a derivative action for a limited liability company, the plaintiff must be a member of
the company when the action is commenced; and:
(l)must have been a member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff
complains; or
(2)the plaintiffs status as a member must have devolved upon the plaintiff by operation
of law or pursuant to the terms of the operating agreement from a person who was a
member at the time of the transaction.
Id; see also Midland Food Servs., LLC v. Castle Hill Holdings V, LLC, 792 A.2d 920, 92829 (Del. Ch. 1999) (explaining purpose of contemporaneous ownership doctrine).
25 Obviously, if another partner or member has not transferred her interest, that other
partner or member could bring the claim. Compare Salsul Co. v. Kohlmeyer, 325 So. 2d 858
(La. App. 1976) (holding that a limited partner's assignee had standing, but not a derivative
claim, analysis questionable); Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989) (holding that
minority shareholder transferred his shares to a church; neither had standing to pursue
derivative claims for wrongs which occurred while original shareholder owned the shares);
Note, The Continuous Ownership Requirement: A Bar to Meritorious Shareholder
Derivative Actions?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1013 (1986).
26 U-H Acquisition Co. v. Barbo, Civ. A. No. 13,279, 1994 WL 34688, at
*3-*4 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 31, 1994) (holding that a limited partner's assignee had no standing to bring a
derivative claim under Delaware law).
27 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1001 (1999) (assignee of limited partner); see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1001 (1999) (allowing assignee of LLC member to bring derivative
claim).
28 Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 795 A.2d 1, 38 (Del. Ch.
2001) (finding general partner liable for $3,417,000 in damages because it caused limited
partnership units to be repurchased through an "odd lot" offering at an unfairly low price and
then resold the units to an affiliate at the same unfair price without determining that the
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context a derivative suit cannot be filed
without the vote of a majority (or other
29
required minimum) of the members.
The plaintiff can easily fall into technical traps, such as failing to verify
the complaint 30 or failing to name the partnership or LLC as a party 3' (even
though the claim is clearly derivative). These and other technical errors may
result in dismissal. There are a few states Where an LLC member simply may
not be permitted to bring a derivative action, but rather is relegated to a special
procedure. 32 In some states, the derivative action must be brought as an
equitable 33
action, thus precluding a jury trial and possibly limiting the type of
remedies.
It is disturbing that in the LLC and limited partnership context, courts have
routinely required the member or limited partner to bring a derivative action
even though there are only a few members or partners and all are before the
court. Although we often think these derivative procedures only apply to cases
involving hundreds of investors, there are numerous cases where these onerous
requirements have been applied to fights involving as few as three, four or five
members. 34 Similarly, where there are only two or three LLC members, courts

terms were substantially equivalent to terms obtainable by the partnership from a comparable
unaffiliated party as required by the partnership agreement).

29 PETER V. FAzIo, JR. & CARTER C. CULVER, ILLINOIS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES §

5.13 (1993). But see Alan R. Bromberg, Enforcement of PartnershipRights-Who Sues for
the Partnership?70 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1991) (pointing out, at least in the partnership context,

that there is a difference between a properly authorized suit brought by the entity (the
required vote having been obtained) and a derivative suit brought when the required vote
cannot be obtained).
30 Abeloff v. Barth, 119 F.R.D. 332 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that failure to verify is
grounds for dismissal even though plaintiffs thought they were pleading a direct claim).
31 Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Florida, Inc., 140 F.3d 898,
910 (11 th Cir. 1998) (holding that even though not required by Florida statute, partnership
must be named).
32 The following states have adopted special procedures modeled on the so-called
prototype act prepared by a committee of the American Bar Association, in lieu of statutory
derivative provisions: ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.730, .735 (Michie 2002); ARK. CODE. ANN.
§§ 4-32-1101, -1102 (Michie 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-187 (West 1997); IDAHO
CODE §§ 53-658 to 53-659 (Michie 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-8-1 (Michie 1999); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.330-335 (Michie 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156C, § 56
(West Supp. 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:76 (1995) (adopted with substantial
modifications); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-57 to 53-19-58 (Michie 2001); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8992 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001) (vote to authorize suit not specified in statute,
left to provisions of operating agreement); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 183.1101 (West Supp. 2002)
(adopted with modifications). Montana at one time had adopted these provisions, but
repealed them and replaced them with the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
derivative provisions. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-1104 (2002).
33 Hames v. Cravens, 966 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Ark. 1998).
34 See Blasberg v. Oxbow Power Corp., 934 F. Supp. 21 (D. Mass. 1996) (two partners:
sole limited partner brought claims against sole general partner); Cabrini Dev. Council v.
LCA-Vision, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (three LLC members); Golden Tee, Inc. v.
Venture Golf Sch., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 625 (Ark. 1998) (dismissing complaint by four partners
against the fifth, who had control of the partnership, for failure to bring action as a derivative
suit); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Ramco Holding Corp., 938 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (three
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have held that the LLC itself is indispensable and must be joined in the
litigation.35 At least one court specifically rejected the argument that there
36
being only one limited partner, the claim should be viewed as direct.
II.

IS AN LLC MEMBER'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM
DIRECT OR DERIVATIVE?

If the member or limited partner has alleged that the manager or general
partner has breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff, may this claim be
brought directly or must it be brought as a derivative claim on behalf of the
partnership or LLC? For example, if the general partner or LLC manager is
alleged to have (1) paid itself payments to which it was not entitled, (2) failed
to monitor the operations of the business, (3) sold business assets to itself or an
affiliate for less than fair market value, (4) made sweetheart deals with its
affiliates, (5) mismanaged funds, (6) failed to perform obligations imposed in
the partnership or operating agreement, (7) used firm assets as security for
personal loans, (8) paid to itself an improperly high price when selling assets to
the entity, or (9) failed to properly investigate a business opportunity, it is not
uncommon for the court to label the claim "derivative." 37 The court will state

partners; noting that complaining limited partner owning 96.5% of the partnership); Whalen
v. Connelly, 545 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1996) (three partners; dismissing one of the limited
partner's claims (brought directly) because he had failed to make demand on the general
partner (defendant)), aff'd, 593 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1999); S.B. McLaughlin & Co., Ltd. v.
Cochrane, No. C4-92-2081, 1993 WL 231672 (Minn. Ct. App. June 29, 1993), aff'd,
Cochrane v. Tudor Oaks Condominium Project, 529 N.W.2d 429 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995);
Chamarac Props., Inc. v. Pike, No. 86 Civ. 7919, 1992 WL 332234 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12,
1992) (three partners); Burstin Investors, Inc. v. K.N. Investors, Ltd., 657 N.Y.S.2d 743
(App. Div. 1997) (two partners); Miltland Raleigh-Durham v. Myers, 807 F. Supp. 1025
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (two partners; noting that sole limited partner was itself a general
partnership of 50 lawyers); Shlomchik v. Richmond, 103 Equities Co., 662 F. Supp. 365,
367 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (ten partners); Hall Family Props., Ltd. v. Gosnell Dev. Corp., 916 P.2d
1098 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (five partners); Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp., 123 F. Supp.
2d 1254 (D. Kan. 2000) (deeming one count derivative, others direct, in disputes among
three LLC members).
35 See Trademark Retail, Inc. v. Apple Glen Investors, LP, 196 F.R.D. 535 (N.D. Ind.
2000) (two members); Weber v. King, 110 F. Supp. 2d 124 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (three
members); Cabrini Dev. Council, 197 F.R.D. at 92 (three members); PacLink
Communications Int'l, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436 (Ct. App. 2001) (eight
members; requiring some claims required to be brought derivatively).
36 Blasberg, 934 F. Supp. at 28 (noting, however, that the defendant general partner
was arguing in favor of the claim being direct so that the case would not be dismissed for
lack of diversity).
37 See, e.g., Litman v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., 611 A.2d 12, 16 (Del. Ch. 1992)
(holding that failure to investigate and monitor partnership investments and placing interest
in general partnership fees above interests of limited partners, which reduced value and
payout, stated a derivative claim); Lenz ex rel. Naples Tennis Resort v. Associated Inns &
Rests. Co. of Am., 833 F. Supp. 362, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that misconduct and
misappropriation of funds which reduce partnership's income and distributions states
derivative claim); In re Granite Partners, L.P., 208 B.R. 332, 344 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)
("Claims of mismanagement, waste and breach of fiduciary duty describe conduct which
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that the injury is really directly suffered by the LLC or partnership as an entity
and that the limited partner or member has suffered any loss only indirectly.
Thus, a derivative claim is appropriate. The partnership's income or assets are
diminished (injured), which only indirectly diminishes the value of the limited
38
partners'
partnership
units.parties
Individual
members
have similarly
been
39 prevented
from directly
suing third
such as
the partnerships'
lenders.
Although

harms an entity directly, and its investors and creditors derivatively.... The investors and
creditors suffer an indirect injury because the wrongful conduct erodes the entity's assets,
making it less likely that it will be able to pay creditors and distribute profits to investors.");
P'ship Equities, Inc. v. Marten, 443 N.E.2d 134, 138-39 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (stating that
all limited partners and creditors have an interest in a claim that the general partner has
prematurely reimbursed itself--or engaged in other mismanagement, negligently diverted
assets, acted beyond authority, or failed to perform partnership obligations); Attick v.
Valeria Assoc., 835 F. Supp. 103, 110-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that limited partner may
not directly bring RICO claim under New York law for alleged looting of partnership, but
does have standing in regard to claim that general partner failed to distribute partnership
assets to limited partner); Kenworthy v. Hargrove, 855 F. Supp. 101, 105-06 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(holding that claim of improper governmental seizure of bank owned by partnership is a
derivative claim under Pennsylvania law), aff'd, 27 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1994); Re v. Weksel,
515 N.Y.S.2d 568 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that claim for recovery of funds belonging to
partnership is a derivative claim); Moore v. Simon Enters., Inc., 919 F. Supp. 1007, 1009
(N.D. Tex. 1995) ("In Bankston, the Fifth Circuit noted that limited partners can only sue
directly for an accounting. The Court held that all other actions by limited partners are
derivative actions."). This statement, however, seems far from accurate. See also Buckley v.
Control Data Corp., 923 F.2d 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1991); Cates v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756
F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1985) (defining broadly those injuries which can only be asserted by the
partnership); Larson v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, 786 P.2d 1176, 1179-80 (Mont.
1990); Caley Invs. Inc. v. Lowe Family Assoc., 754 P.2d 793, 795 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988);
Thomasson v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 657 F. Supp. 448, 453-54 (S.D. Tex. 1987)
(applying Texas law in bankruptcy context), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1988); Summit
Ridge Apartments v. Summit Ridge Assoc. (In re Summit Ridge Apts.), 104 B.R. 405
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989) (applying Alabama law in bankruptcy context); In re USACafes,
L.P. Litig., Civ. A. No. 11146, 1993 WL 18769 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 1993); Golden Tee, 969
S.W.2d at 625; Hauer v. Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 509 F. Supp.168, 175 (E.D. Wis. 1981),
aff'd, 671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982); Dayton Monetary Assoc. v. Donaldson, Lufkin, &
Jenrette Sec. Corp., No. 91 CIV 2050 (LLS), 1993 WL 410503, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14,
1993); ABF Capital Mgmt. v. Askin Capital Mgmt., L.P., No. 96 CIV 2978(RWS), 1997
WL 317365, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1997) (applying Delaware law in bankruptcy context);
Silveri v. Mirsky, No. 95 CIV. 10234(JFK), 1997 WL 473544 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1997); UH Acquisition Co. v. Barbo, Civ. A. No. 13,279, 1994 WL 34688 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1994);
Smyth v. Marshall Field, Fifth, No. 917803F, 1993 WL 818732, at *3 (Mass. Super. Nov.
17, 1993) (applying Delaware law), affd, 666 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996);
Ball v. Field, No. 90 C 4383, 1992 WL 57187, at *8-*9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 1992); Bennett
Assoc. v. Furman, No. 91 Civ. 3118(JGK), 1997 WL 531310, at *3-*4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28,
1997) (citing many New York authorities stating that injury to the partnership, such as by
looting, may only be brought derivatively); Field Enters. v. Gresser, No. 89-1234, 1990 WL
262001, at *8 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1990) (holding that limited partners in an Illinois
limited partnership may only sue derivatively for breaches of duties owed to partners or the
partnership).
38 Litman, 611 A.2d at 16.
39 N. Trust Co. v. VIII S. Mich. Assoc., 657 N.E.2d 1095, 1101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(holding that limited partners, claiming injury to their interest in the partnership by actions of
partnership lender, must pursue their claims derivatively). ContraHirsch v.Arthur Andersen
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the characterization in the pleading may not be controlling, 40 sometimes the
lawyer, by pleading the wrong theory, may add to the problem.41 In at least one
case, the court found that the action was derivative even though both the
plaintiff and defendant agreed that the action was direct.42 At least two
decisions state that, by electing the limited partnership form, the limited
partners give up their rights to pursue claims directly.43 This makes no sense at
all and probably is contrary to the normal expectations of most
businesspersons.44

& Co., 72 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that only limited partners may bring claim
against partnership accountant and that trustee of general partner precluded from bringing
claim because it is the limited partners who seek recovery from accountants and lawyers);
see also Industrial Elecs. Corp. v. iPower Distribution Group, Inc., 215 F.3d 677, 680, 681
n.3 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that LLC member of franchisee could not sue franchisor for
injuries suffered by association or those suffered indirectly by members, but inconsistently
indicating that member might be able to sue as a third-party beneficiary).
40 Sturm v. Marriott Marquis Corp., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000) ("In
deciding whether a complaint states an individual or a derivative claim, the Court is not
bound by the designation chosen by the plaintiff.")
41 Lenz, 833 F. Supp. at 379 ("With respect to the allegations of breach of fiduciary
duty, conversion, and negligence, plaintiff himself has characterized his claims as derivative
in nature.... Although it should be noted that in determining whether a claim is derivative
or direct, the court must look to the nature of the wrongs alleged in the body of plaintiffs
complaint, and is not limited by plaintiff's characterization or stated intention ....");U.S.
Cellular Inv. Co., Inc. v. S.W. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc.,124 F.3d 180, 181-82 (10th Cir. 1997)
(J. Baldock, dissenting) (stating that the prayer of each count of the complaint requests a
remedy for the partnership's benefit and only alleges specific injuries to the partnership;
therefore, even though not captioned as a derivative claim, it is actually plead as a derivative
claim); Trademark Retail, Inc. v. Apple Glen Investors, LP, 196 F.R.D. 535, 540 (N.D. Ind.
2000) (finding that complaint repeatedly referenced harm that would befall the LLC which
belied plaintiff's argument that the LLC was not a necessary party to the litigation); Carson
v. Lynch Multimedia Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting that LLC
member who was squeezed out of LLC-clearly a direct injury-stated only derivative and
not direct claim because pleadings only stated that the actions were not in the interest of the
LLC rather than stating they were injurious to the member). Compare Trademark Retail, 196
F.R.D. at 542 (finding LLC indispensable for federal diversity purposes because the plaintiff
referenced the LLC's name in the pleadings).
42 Moore v. Simon Enter., Inc., 919 F. Supp. 1007 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that
because the action was derivative the court could dismiss the action because the entity was
required to be joined, which thus destroyed diversity).
43 Moore, 919 F. Supp. at 1012 (finding that in exchange for limited liability, the
limited partner surrenders her rights to bring claims for damages to the limited partnership
itself and must bring such claims derivatively); see also N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Ramco
Holding Corp., 938 F. Supp. 754, 757 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (adopting the same principle and
also concluding that the partnership is "indispensable"). Compare Kenworthy v. Hargrove,
855 F. Supp. 101, 105 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (suggesting that limited partners had no right to bring
a direct suit because that would overstep the restricted role of limited partners imposed by
both the ULPA and common law), aff'd, 27 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1994).
44 Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus.
LAW 699, 707 (1993) (stating that in choosing the form of entity, investors do not consider
the "different dissolution rules," i.e., whether they have a right to directly sue for breaches of
fiduciary duty inflicted upon them). Compare Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 675 (Va.
2001) (stating that minority shareholders of a closely held corporation should not be entitled
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Interestingly, there are hundreds of cases in which a partner or LLC
member has proceeded directly against a partner or LLC manager and no one
45
has even raised the issue of whether the case was properly brought directly.
Maybe the reason the defendants in these cases do not claim that the action

should be brought derivatively is that they recognize that it is an argument that
would or should fail.
A.

How Have Courts Determinedif a Claim is Derivativeor Direct?

Unfortunately, instead of asking, "Is this a claim where the policies
supporting a derivative action will come into play?," the courts rather routinely
have looked to shortcut, mechanical tests to determine if a member's fiduciary
breach claim may proceed without joining the LLC or partnership.
The Delaware Chancery Court has stated:
The distinction between direct and derivative claims depends upon "the
nature of the wrong alleged' and the relief, if any, which could result if
the plaintiff were to prevail." . . . A direct claim seeks relief for injuries
that fall distinctly upon the individual participants in the business
association or involve the participants' contractual rights. On the other
hand, a derivative claim states injury against and seeks relief for a
business association as a whole. Any relief flowing to the association's
participants as individuals only 46
comes to them indirectly by way of their
pro-rata stake in the association.

to an exception that their derivative claims could be brought directly because "consistent
application of commercial rules promotes predictability").
45 See, e.g., Loyola Fed. Sav. Bank v. Fickling, 58 F.3d 603, 607 (11th
Cir. 1995)
(stating that limited partner entitled to share in side fee paid to general partner in breach of
duty of loyalty case); Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that limited
partner entitled to his share of usurped partnership opportunity in breach of duty of loyalty
case); Arifin v. Schude, No. 98 C 1591, 1999 WL 342395, at *4-*5 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1999)
(holding that if one member misappropriates LLC funds, the other has a right to bring a
direct claim in breach of duty of loyalty case); Gattoni v. Zaccaro, No. CV 970396081, 1997
WL 139410 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1997) (describing direct allegations by LLC member
for conversion and theft of LLC assets in breach of duty of loyalty case); F & S Enters. Inc.
v. Cure, 690 So. 2d 263 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that failure to disclose that general
partner was taking business for himself entitled limited partner to his share of profitsbreach of duty of full disclosure); Crossen v. Bernstein, No. 91 Civ. 350 1(PKL), 1994 WL
281881, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1994) (fraudulent concealment claims); Glanzer v. St.
Joseph Indian Sch., 438 N.W.2d 204 (S.D. 1989) (allowing sole limited partner to recover
lost profits due to general partner's mismanagement in breach of duty of care case); Fisher v.
Reich, No. 92 Civ. 4158 (MBM), 1995 WL 23966 at *13-*14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1995)
(holding that limited partners' claims for breach of fiduciary duties survived motion for
summary judgment).
46 In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P., No. C.A. 14634, 2000 WL 130629, at *3
(Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2000) (citing Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Del. 1996), Kramer
v. Western Pacific Industries, Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 352 (Del. 1988), Elster v. American
Airlines, 100 A.2d 219, 221-23 (Del. Ch. 1953), and Moran v. Household International.,
Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch. 1985)).
In a derivative suit, a limited partner sues on behalf of the partnership. Mallia v.
Painewebber, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 277, 282 (S.D. Tex. 1995). A plaintiff bringing an
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Not only do mechanical tests fail to address the underlying issue of
whether it really is necessary for the action to proceed as a derivative claim, but
because of their general and ambiguous nature, they also fail to provide clear
direction.47

According to one leading authority, 48 some courts have wrongly
incorporated the requirement that a limited partner, in order to bring a direct
action, must be injured in a manner separate and distinct from the other limited
partners. 49 At least in the context of corporate derivative actions, even Moore
cites this as an appropriate "test. 50 If one LLC member's injury is in fact
separate from that of the other members, this should be grounds for a direct

individual direct action must be injured directly or independently of the partnership. Id The
determination hinges on whether the primary injury alleged in the complaint is to the
partnership or to the individual plaintiffs. Id. When a limited partner alleges wrongs to the
limited partnership that render her interest in the partnership of lesser value, the partner is
required to bring the claim derivatively. Id.
47 Blasberg v. Oxbow Power Corp., 934 F. Supp. 21, 26 (D. Mass. 1996).
When bringing a direct action against a general partner, a limited partner must show
both that the right to recover for the alleged breach belongs to it, rather than the
partnership, and that it sustained injury.... Conversely, as to a derivative action, it is
the partnership that must have the right to recovery and must sustain the injury alleged.
What differentiates a direct from a derivative suit is neither the nature of the damages
that result from the defendant's alleged conduct, nor the identity of the party who
sustained the brunt of the damages, but rather the source of the claim ....
Id. (quoting Branch v. Ernst & Young U.S., No. Civ. A. 93-10024-RGS, 1995 WL 791941,
at *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 1995) (applying corporate principles), and Muirfield (Del.), L.P. v.
Pitts, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 600, 608 (W.D. La. 1998) ("The characterization depends on
whether the partner individually or the partnership as a separate entity suffered the injury."));
accordLenz ex rel. Naples Tennis Resort v. Associated Inns & Rests Co., 833 F. Supp. 362,
379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Ramco Holding Corp., 938 F. Supp. at 756 (quoting the "rule"
that the limited partner must be injured directly or independently of the partnership, but
ignoring various claims, such as a failure to make distributions in the millions of dollarswhich certainly suggests a "direct" injury to the limited partner).
48 Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or "What's a
Lawsuit Between Friends in an 'IncorporatedPartnership'?"22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
1203, 1249 (1996) ("When a shareholder derives his standing from the injury done to the
corporation, the suit is derivative. To have a direct claim a plaintiff indeed must have a
separate injury-but separate from the corporation, not necessarily from fellow
shareholders.").
49 U.S. Cellular Inv. Co., Inc. v. S.W. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 124 F.3d 180, 181 (10th
Cir. 1997) (Baldock, J., dissenting) (stating that plaintiffs injury must be separate and
distinct from that suffered by other partners); Jackson v. Marshall, 537 S.E.2d 232, 235
(N.C. App. 2000) (holding that although the court stated the rule to be that the plaintiff, in
order to bring a direct suit, had to be injured in a manner different from the "corporation" and
then determining that the action was derivative because "[a]ll limited partners are similarly
affected by the general partners's business decision"); Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp.,
123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that an LLC member could not bring
direct claim because it did not suffer a "disproportionate" injury).
50 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, supra note 16, 23.1.04[2] (outlining his test for a "direct"
claim: either the defendant breached a duty owed directly to the plaintiff or the plaintiffs
injury is separate and distinct from that of the other shareholders).
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action, 51 but there should be no requirement that there must always be an injury
separate from that suffered by the other members or partners.
52
Many of the cases have simply copied or adapted the corporate tests.
Although there are similarities between the corporate form of doing business
and the limited partnership or LLC, there are significant differences which
certainly should influence what is an appropriate test, or at least how that test is
applied. 3 The Delaware Chancery Court has recently criticized
the mechanical
54
application of the corporate tests in the partnership context.
Proof of the undesirability of using such a rigid, nonanalytical "test" to
separate direct from derivative claims is found in the inconsistency in types of
corporate cases which have been pigeonholed into each category. For example,
51 U.S. Cellular Inv. Co., 1997 WL 575820, at *5 ("[L]imited partners can bring a
direct action when the injury can be differentiated from that suffered by the other partners.").
52 Lenz, 833 F. Supp. at 380 n.18. The determination of whether a fiduciary duty

lawsuit is derivative or direct in a nature is substantially the same in the corporate and
limited partnership contexts. Id. Because the duties of a general partner and a corporate
director are similar, it follows that the determination of the nature of claims arising from a
breach of analogous duties would also prove very similar. Id. See also Safety Techs., L.C. v.
Biotronix 2000, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172 n.3 (D. Kan. 2001) ("The court believes that the
Kansas Supreme Court would also apply this precedent limiting lawsuits by individual
shareholders to limit lawsuits by members of limited liability companies."); PacLink
Communications Int'l, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal Rptr. 2d 436, 439-41 (Ct. App. 2001)
(stating that the parties agree that the principles of derivative lawsuits applicable to
corporations likewise apply to a limited liability company; applying corporate "test" to
determine that action must be brought derivatively); Trademark Retail, Inc. v. Apple Glen
Investors, LP, 196 F.R.D. 535 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (applying corporate principles to a dispute
among members of an LLC); Excimer Assocs., Inc. v. Cabrini Dev. Council, 292 F.3d 134
(2d Cir. 2002) (applying corporate principles in LLC litigation); Carson v. Lynch
Multimedia Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259 (D. Kan. 2000) (applying corporate rules in
the context of a dispute among LLC members); 7547 Corp. v. Parker & Parsley Dev.
Partners, L.P., 38 F.3d 211, 220 (5th Cir. 1994); Ramco Holding Corp., 938 F. Supp. at 756;
Blasberg, 934 F. Supp. at 26; Strain v. Seven Hills Assoc., L.P. 429 N.Y.S.2d 424, 432-32
(App. Div. 1980); Litman v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., 611 A.2d 12, 15 (Del. Ch. 1992);
Energy Investors Fund, L.P. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 525 S.E. 2d 441 (N.C. 2000);
Jackson v. Marshall, 537 S.E. 2d 232 (N.C. App. 2000);,cf Brock v. Baskin-Robbins USA
Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1092 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (citing Alabama LLC case for proposition
that shareholders could not sue for wrong done to corporation).
53 See infra notes 88-89. A significant difference between the limited partner and the
corporate shareholder is the nature of its ownership interest. See id. Although it may be true
that an action which deprives the corporation of profits may only indirectly injure the
shareholders, this deprivation in the partnership context has a direct effect on the partner's
capital account and ownership interest. See id; see also Gagan v. American Cablevision,
Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 960 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that reason prohibiting shareholder from
bringing direct RICO claim may not apply to limited partners).
54 In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P., No. C.A. 14634, 2000 WL 130629, at *2
(Del. Ch. Jan 27, 2000).
Mechanistically applying the corporate common law rules surrounding derivative
claims can sometimes defeat efficient resolution of claims made in other contexts,
however. In cases like the present one involving alternative business entities [limited
partnership], the Court looks at corporate law precedent but, while doing so, recognizes
the need for flexibility in determining its applicability.
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Moore states that claims against corporate officers or majority shareholders for
waste or mismanagement are properly brought as derivative suits; however,
claims alleging the breach of a fiduciary duty owed by a majority shareholder
to a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation and claims of corporate
mismanagement which have arisen to an extreme level, such as when the very
integrity of the corporation is threatened by a diversion of its assets, are
properly brought directly. 55 What is the difference between these claims? Why
should one be brought derivatively and the other directly? Are they not
effectively the same claim?
Rather than attempt to formulate a mechanical test, it seems much more
desirable to ask whether or not the purposes supporting the derivative action are
applicable and, if not, to permit the partner or member to proceed with the
direct action. This policy-based test to determine if a derivative action is
required is discussed in section II.B of this Article.
1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims in the LLC and Limited Partnership
Context are Direct-NotDerivative-Claims

When specifically faced with the question of whether a breach of fiduciary
duty raises a direct or derivative claim, and in spite of these mechanical tests
which prejudice the decision in favor of labeling the claim "derivative," many
cases have concluded that an injured limited partner or LLC member should
have the right to direct redress against the managing partner or member. 56 If all
the partners or LLC members are joined (either as plaintiffs or defendants), or
those not joined have relinquished any claim or interest in the litigation, the
partnership or LLC as an aggregate of its members simply has no additional or
separate interest. 58 Suits by limited partners against the general partner alleging

55 5 MOORE, supra note 16, 23.1.02[3][b].
56 Whalen v. Carter, 954 F.2d 1087, 1093 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding, but without
explaining the reason, that if damage to the partnership is caused by a partner and not a third
party the individual partners have standing to directly sue).
57 Cf Ehlen v. Lewis, 984 F. Supp. 5, 11 n.5 (D.D.C. 1997) (refusing to consider an
argument, made for the first time at closing argument, that neither the partnership nor the
other limited partner had been joined in the action in a case where a general partner had
defrauded the two limited partners out of $700,000). Judge Sporkin noted that the defendants
had clearly breached their duties to the limited partner and that the court was unwilling to
allow the wrongdoers to benefit from their own wrongs merely because not every possible
plaintiff (i. e., the other limited partner) had joined in the suit.
58 See, e.g., Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., No. 81 Civ. 5832(CBM), 1985 WL 566
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1106 (2d Cir. 1986); Elf Atochem, Inc. v. Jaffari,
727 A.2d 286, 293 (Del. 1999) (refuting the argument that the LLC is not bound by an
arbitration clause in the operating agreement because the LLC did not sign the document: "It
is the members who are the real parties in interest. The LLC is simply their joint business
vehicle. This is the contemplation of the statute in prescribing the outlines of a limited
liability company agreement."); HB Gen. Corp. v. Manchester Partners, L.P., 95 F.3d 1185,
1196 (3d Cir. 1996).
Partnerships lack consistent entity-treatment, and at least for small partnerships, the
determination of whether the partners' interests align with those of the partnership is
not difficult. In this case, the Partnership consists of essentially two (though formally
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breach of fiduciary duty do not interfere with the operation of the entitywhich might otherwise be a reason to require the action to be brought
derivatively. 9 The case may be in a posture that causes the reasons behind the
three) members, and we are easily able to determine that the individual partners
effectively represent the Partnership.
Id.; Farey-Jones v. Buckingham, 132 F. Supp. 2d 92, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (permitting
partnership to assign its 1Ob-5 claim to the sole remaining partner who, being the only
person who retained an interest in the partnership, could directly bring the claim in his own
name). Compare VMS/PCA Ltd. P'ship v. PCA Partners Ltd. P'ship, 727 F. Supp. 1167,
1170 (N.D. Il. 1989) (stating that the joint venture not a necessary party).
Since both of the joint venturers ... were parties at the time we made our decision,
complete relief could have been accorded the parties even if the Joint Venture was not
joined. Likewise, as best as we can discern, the Joint Venture did not have any interests
separate from those of VMS and PCA [joint venturers]. Proceeding without the Joint
Venture would not, 'as a practical matter,' have impaired or impeded its ability to
protect its interests.
Id.; Muirfield (Del.) L.P. v. Pitts, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 600, 609 (W.D. La. 1998) (stating that
partnerships are artificial entities that act through their general partners, and if court orders
specific performance, it is the partners who will act and who adequately represent the
interests of the partnership); Pucci v. Santi, 711 F. Supp. 916, 927 n.4 (N.D. 111.1989)
(suggesting that lawyer represents each member in the aggregate (each of the limited
partners) in a direct action by limited partners against partnership's lawyer for failing to
disclose that the general partner and affiliates were defrauding the limited partners); In re
Fidelity Am. Fin. Corp., 43 B.R. 74, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (stating that limited partners
were "parties in interest" and had standing to file an objection to a settlement whereby the
partnership would essentially lose all its assets in return for the payment of only $5,000); ef
Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Utah 1998)
(quoting from comment (e) to 2 A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01(d) (1994): "[T]he concept of a corporate injury that is

distinct from any injury to the shareholders approaches the fictional in the case of a firm with
only a handful of shareholders"). Contra R.S. Ellsworth, Inc. v. AMFAC Fin. Corp., 652
P.2d 1114, 1118 (Haw. 1982).
The interests of individual partners are not necessarily identical to the interests of the
limited partnership entity as a whole. If plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with an
individual action, the interests of the limited partnership could be harmed and
defendants could also be open to multiple litigation brought by parties not joined in the
action.
Id.
59 Goldman v. McMahan, Brafman, Morgan & Co., No 85 Civ. 2236(PKL), 1987 WL
12820, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1987) (holding that suit by limited partners did not
interfere with carrying on the business where general partners are alleged to be acting in
complicity with those purportedly wronging the partnership; citing Riviera Congress
Associates v. Yassky, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 392 (App. Div. 1966)); In re Cencom Cable Income
Partners, L.P., No. 14634, 2000 WL 130629, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2000) (holding that the
partnership's business was complete; the challenge was merely to the general partner's
actions in the final sale transaction and not any ongoing conduct, thus there was no need for
a derivative claim or any sort of demand requirement); Gagan v. Am. Cablevision, Inc., 77
F.3d 951, 959-60 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that limited partner does not interfere with
operation of the entity in bringing a direct RICO suit against both the general partner and
nonpartners who defrauded the partnership, citing Whalen, 954 F.2d at 1093); Guenther v.
Fariss, 833 P.2d 417, 421 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). In Guenther, after the death of one of the
general partners, the remaining general and sole limited partner were involved in litigation
over what share of the partnership each owned. Id. The general partner brought a declaratory
judgment action in which it joined the partnership, according to the limited partner, only so
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derivative "demand" and other such requirements to be inapplicable. In fact,
the myriad of derivative procedures are premised on the notion that there will
be "independent and disinterested directors" who will impartially evaluate the
derivative claim. This notion simply does not exist in the context of a closely
of
held LLC and may be the most fundamental reason why the entire notion
61
derivative actions has no relevance to the closely held LLC or partnership.
If the claim is brought against a third party who the general partner has
refused to sue, the court may grant the limited partner standing to make a direct
claim for injuries to himself and the partnership. 62 Alternatively, perhaps the
third party's duty runs directly to the investors. 6 3 Maybe the direct suit is
permissible for the simple reason that general partners and LLC managers owe
direct fiduciary and contractual duties to the investors. A direct duty mandates
a direct recovery if there is a breach of the contract 64 or a breach of fiduciary

that the costs of the litigation could be charged to the partnership. Id. Although the general
partner hypothesized several situations in which operation of the partnership might be
affected by the rights of the partners-for example, the percentage of each partner's interest
in the partnership determines the amount accessible by the partnership to pay judgment
creditors of the individual partners-the court noted that the "effect on operations" does not
require the partnership to be joined and agreed with the limited partner that the partnership
should be dismissed. Id.
60 Cencom Cable, 2000 WL 130629, at *5 (finding that the two reasons for the demand
rule--(1) acting as a gatekeeper to encourage extra judicial intracorporate solutions to
internal problems and (2) barring meritless claims of self-interested decision making-were
not present when all the limited partners were aligned against the general partner, the
partnership was in winding up, and the disputes related to the liquidation of the business).
61 See infra note 151 (discussing the futility of demand); see generally Dennis Block, et
al., Derivative Litigation: CurrentLaw Versus The American Law Institute, 48 Bus. LAW.
1443, 1445 n. 1I (1993) (pointing out differences in litigation involving close corporations
lacking independent directors).
62 See, e.g., Mannaberg v. Herbst, 45 N.Y.S.2d 197, 201 (Sup. Ct. 1943), affd, 47
N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div.1944), aff'd, 56 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1944); Dohm v. O'Keefe, 458
So. 2d 964, 966 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (concurring opinion) (stating that limited partner may
seek redress where general partner conspires with third party; action is not brought on behalf
of the partnership because general partner could lose $3 million); Cates v. Int'l Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1179 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that where, for improper and ulterior
motives, those in control decline to pursue a valuable partnership cause of action, minority
partner might be able to sue for his fraction of partnership cause of action); see also Allied
Chem. Co. v. DeHaven, 824 S.W. 2d 257, 264 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that one partner
may sue third party where the other partners are also named as defendants); USM Corp. v.
Tremco, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (allowing one of twelve partners to bring
suit individually for trademark infringement because partnership agreement gave plaintiff the
exclusive rights to patent in United States).
63 Browning v. Maurice B. Levien & Co., P.C., 262 S.E.2d 355, 357 (N.C. Ct. App.
1980). In Browning, the limited partners were required to sue directly, and were not
permitted to sue derivately on behalf of the partnership. Id. ("In this case the plaintiffs are
suing for damages to their interest in the partnership based on the negligence of the
defendants. There is no necessity that they be allowed to sue on behalf of the limited
partnership."). The court went on to note that the defendant could reasonably foresee that the
limited partners as "owners of the property" would rely on the architect's certification. Id.
64 U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. of Okla. City, Inc. v. S.W. Bell Mobile Sys. Inc., Nos. 966140, 96-6146 & 96-6294, 1997 WL 575820, at *5, 124 F.3d 218 (10th Cir. Sept. 17, 1997)
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duty. 65 The numerous RICO cases in which the partners have been permitted to
proceed directly against those in control for breaching duties owed to the

(unpublished table decision) (noting that courts have allowed claims for (1) an accounting,
(2) fiduciary breach, and (3) breach of the partnership agreement to proceed as individual
claims in varying circumstances); HB Gen. Corp. v. Manchester Partners, L.P., 95 F.3d
1185, 1195 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that breach of a partnership agreement has been held to
constitute an individual as well as a partnership claim); Westminster Prop. Inc. v. Atlanta
Assocs., 301 S.E.2d 636, 639 (Ga. 1983) (stating general partner may be able to recover
directly as a third party beneficiary for limited partner's failure to make certain contributions,
which were to be applied to reduce partnership obligations owed the general partner);
Cogniplex, Inc. v. Ross, No. 00 C 7463, 00 C 7933, 2001 WL 436210, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
27, 2001) (permitting members to directly sue another member for breach of contract even
though parties did not execute operating agreement; requiring further review as to whether
facts demonstrate that members actually structured their LLC like a partnership-contractually binding each other-rather than like a corporation); see also Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Privity Requirement Reconsidered, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 967, 983 (1996)
(making the statement, in the context of lawyer's responsibilities to partners: "Thus, a
general partner's wrongful appropriation of a partnership business opportunity is a wrong not
simply to the entity, but also to each partner's undivided interest in the venture. Second, and
relatedly, it follows that each of the individual partners has standing to sue for such
injuries."); 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON

PARTNERSHIPS, § 15.04(h) (2002) (stating that claims which might be either individual or

partnership claims include: (1) accounting, which may include fiduciary breach, (2) fiduciary
breach, depending on whether the duty is deemed owed to the partners (as individuals) or to
the partnership, (3) mismanagement of the partnership, and (4) breach of the partnership
agreement); Indus. Elecs. Corp. v. iPower Distribution Group, Inc., 215 F. 3d 677, 681 n.3
(7th Cir. 2000) (stating that one LLC member "might" be entitled to sue third party which
injured LLC and member's interest based on third-party beneficiary theory); Miss. Fleet
Card, L.L.C. v. Bilstat, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 894, 901 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (holding that LLC
members who brought identical direct claims to those of LLC as third-party beneficiaries
were required to arbitrate their claims, even though only the LLC had signed the contract
which included the arbitration clause).
65 Bane v. LeRoux (In re Curran), 157 B.R. 500, 507 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (holding
that, under Massachusetts law, partner is liable directly to injured partner for breach of
fiduciary duty; citing Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 486 N.E.2d 70 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1985)); Reeve v. Folly Hill Ltd. P'ship, 628 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)
(holding that when limited partner who was seeking funds due for his benefit alone, claim
was based on breach of fiduciary duty by general partner, which is not a derivative claim);
Dean v. Dick, No. Civ. A. 16566, 1999 WL 413400, at *1 n.1 (Del. Ch. June 10, 1999)
(questioning whether breach of fiduciary duty claims brought derivatively should have been
brought directly because certain of the claims are for personal injuries). Compare In re E.F.
Hutton Southwest Props. I1,Ltd., 103 B.R. 808, 816 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 953 F.2d
963 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that limited partners' claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach
of duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and others brought against general
partner are not property of the bankrupt estate; rather, they are the individual property of the
partners); Crossen v. Bernstein, No. 91 Civ. 3501(PKL), 1994 WL 281881, at *3-*4
(S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1994) (stating that nondisclosure claim could be brought directly, but
claims against general partner and affiliates for breach of contract, gross negligence,
partnership waste, unjust enrichment, conversion, and embezzlement all required to be
brought derivatively); Jackson v. Marshall, 537 S.E.2d 232, 236 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)
(recognizing that a limited partner could bring a direct action based on "special duty" owed
by general partner, but illogically said claim could not be brought "directly" in this case
because trial court found general partner met business judgment standard; conclusion
criticized by concurring opinion); Excimer Assocs., Inc. v. Cabrini Dev. Council, 292 F.3d
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partners reinforce this. 66 General partners who profit through sales to the
partnership commit67fraud on the limited partners who therefore have standing
to sue individually.
134, 140 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying in the LLC context the principle that a shareholder may
bring an individual suit if the defendant has violated an independent duty to the shareholder,
whether or not the corporation may also bring an action). Contra Sussman v. Paradigm
Partners, Inc., No. 91 CIV. 2891 (KMW), 1993 WL 410460, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993)
(finding that general partners' fiduciary and contractual duties to monitor investment
advisors were owed to the partnership rather than to the plaintiffs directly).
66 See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Silver, 966 F. Supp. 587, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(stating that limited partner entitled to recover the amount it individually lost because of
general partner's self dealing and misappropriation of funds, both as to its RICO claim and
breach of fiduciary duty claims), aft'd, 114 F.3d 1191(7th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
opinion); Gagan v. Am. Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 960 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
where wrongdoers include the general partners, limited partners have standing to bring direct
RICO claims); Whalen v. Carter, 954 F.2d 1087, 1093 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that limited
partner normally does not have standing to bring a RICO claim if his injury is derived from
injuries to the partnership; however, if the injury to the partnership was caused by the
defendant partner, then the limited partners do have standing to directly pursue the RICO
claim); 131 Main St. Assoc. v. Manko, 897 F. Supp. 1507 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that
RICO claims were properly brought against even "innocent" general partners in tax fraud
scheme where claimed deductions were not possible and certain defendants looted the
limited partner's money); Perlman v. Zell, 938 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. 111.1996) (stating that
limited partner's RICO claim based on securities violations, conversion, and embezzlement
of partnership funds survived a motion to dismiss), rev'd, 185 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 1999)
(finding a failure to prove pattern of racketeering); Rohland v. Syn-Fuel Assocs., 879 F.
Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that limited partners stated RICO claim against general
partner and others based in part on allegations of fraudulent administration of partnership
and concealment of fraud); Miltland Raleigh-Durham v. Meyers, 807 F. Supp. 1025
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (upholding limited partners' RICO claim and breach of fiduciary duty claim
against general partners who, among other things, secretly diverted substantial sums from the
partnership); Silverman v. Niswonger, 761 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (stating that
limited partners stated RICO claim where general partners diverted partnership funds);
Dooner v. NMI, Ltd., 725 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (allowing sole limited partner to
replead RICO claim against general partner and affiliates, based on allegations that those in
control had improperly allowed partnership securities to be used as collateral for
nonpartnership debts because, when market crashed, limited partners' investment was wiped
out); Ferguson v. Lurie, No. 89 C 2283, 1994 WL 71480, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 1994)
(stating that the limited partners' RICO and other claims survived defendants motion for
judgment as a matter of law); Leroy v. Paytel III Mgmt. Ass'n., Inc., No. 91 CIV 1993(JFK),
1992 WL 367090, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1992) (stating that limited partners' RICO claim
survived a motion for summary judgment); Jameson v. Prudential-Bache Sec., No. 89 CIV
1043(PNL), 1990 WL 52197 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1990) (denying motion to dismiss limited
partner's direct RICO claims); Benson v. Richardson, Civ. No. C 86-2009, 1990 WL
290144, *39 (N.D. Iowa July 16, 1990) (finding that limited partner entitled to recover on
RICO claim against promoter and on pendent state claims against others); Friedman v.
Hartman, No. 91 CIV. 1523(PKL), 1994 WL 97104, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1994)
(holding that limited partners' RICO and breach of fiduciary claims were successful against
general partners, although noting that the lawyer had no contractual duty to the limited
partners); cf Attick v. Valeria Assoc., 835 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (deciding that
limited partner had no standing to assert RICO claims for diminution of value of its
investment, but did state cause of action in alleging joint venturer transferred property to
itself, rather than as was required by partnership agreement); Ball v. Field, No. 90-C-4383,
1993 WL 101485, at *11 (N.D. I11.Apr. 2, 1993) (concluding that the limited partners'
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Partners often have a statutory or contractual right to directly receive an
"account" from those in control of the business, and this obligation may be
directly enforced by the investor. 68 Members of LLCs may have the same
right. 6 Likewise, a number of courts have permitted one partner to bring a
direct action against another partner for "an accounting" without joinder of the
partnership. 70 For example, a prominent law firm invested (as a limited partner)
in a project to renovate a motel, but the general partner essentially took all the
monies invested by the law firm and none of the monies went into the project.
The limited partner, in a direct action against the general partner and affiliated

allegations, apparently brought directly, that defendants had used partnership assets to
collateralize outside loans and diluted partnership equity by inflating fees adequately alleged
RICO claims). However, in an earlier hearing on this matter, a different judge concluded that
any RICO claims must be brought derivatively. See No. 90-C-4383, 1992 WL 57187, at *9
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 1992).
67 Dohm, 458 So.2d at 965-66 (stating that plaintiffs status as a limited partner did not
strip her of the capacity to sue to protect her interests; she has a right to sue for the fraud
committed against her).
68 U.S. Cellular Inv. Co., 1997 WL 575820, at *5 (stating that the partnership
agreement, similar to the UPA, permitted each limited partner to have "a formal account of
partnership affairs whenever circumstances render it just and reasonable," which it may
bring directly; also stating that, given that the general partner owns 62% of the limited
partnership and has not been injured by its conduct (and indeed profited), the other partners,
including the plaintiff, have an injury that is separate and distinct from the general partner
and the limited partnership); see generally JAMES R. BURKHARD, PARTNERSHIP AND LLC
LITIGATION MANUAL: ACTIONS FOR ACCOUNTING AND OTHER REMEDIES ch. 7 (1995).

69 Lawson v. Tax Lien Res. Group, LLC, No. 98 C 245, 1998 WL 957331 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 15, 1998) (describing allegations, when former member of the LLC directly sued both
the LLC and the other two members: (1) members owed her a formal accounting for their
operation and management of the LLC, (2) other members wrongfully withheld $18,000 in
unpaid compensation owed plaintiff, and (3) members wrongfully withheld plaintiffs share
of profits, an amount in excess of $100,000); Diaz v. Fernandez, 910 P.2d 96 (Colo. Ct. App.
1995) (involving suit brought directly and derivatively by 49% member against 51%
member, alleging dissipation of assets by mismanagement and fraudulent conduct and
requesting an accounting and appointment of a receiver).
70 Chen v. Wang, No. 96 C 0681, 1998 WL 27140, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Jan 16, 1998)
(stating that neither joint venture nor partnership needs to be a party: the accounting is
between the partners themselves); In re Estate of Brandt, 440 N.Y.S.2d 189, 197 (App. Div.
1981) (stating that limited partner cannot be deprived of its statutory right to a direct
accounting; no requirement to bring the action derivatively); Alpert v. Haimes, 315 N.Y.S.
2d 332, 336 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (finding that claims for (1) failure to distribute profits, (2)
diversion of partnership funds, and (3) conspiracy to defraud the partnership in its operation
and sale of real property, could all be brought directly by the complaining limited partner as
an accounting); U.S. Cellular Inv. Co., 1997 WL 575820, at *4-*6 (finding that partnership
agreement and UPA both grant the limited partner the right to a formal account and that
limited partners were injured separately from the partnership.); Godine & Studna, Inc. v.
Reading Station Assoc. L. P., Civ. A. No. 89-0514, 1989 WL 49214, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 4,
1989) (finding that where partnership had no assets, no requirement to join it); see also
Sommer v. PMEC Assoc. & Co. Ltd., No. 88 Civ. 2537 (JFK), 1992 WL 196748 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 5, 1992); Head v. Roberts, 291 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956) (describing sole
limited partner's request for partnership accounting).
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parties, was granted an accounting. 7 1 The accounting resulted in an order that

the general partner directly repay the limited partner 7its capital contributions,
which were wrongly withdrawn by the general partner. 2
In most jurisdictions, both limited partners and LLC members also have

the statutory right to directly bring an action to dissolve the entity when those
in charge are acting inappropriately. This will likely require joinder of the LLC
or partnership as a defendant, but the statutes do not require a derivative
action. 73 In a similar action, one court, upon the direct request of a partner and

without joining the partnership as a party, enforced a side agreement that
allowed the 4partner to buyout another with the resulting dissolution of the
partnership.
Of course, dissolution of the partnership or LLC may be
undesirable because it may be slow, may require the liquidation of what might
otherwise be a profitable investment, and can create tax problems. 75 However,

at least one opinion suggests that a dissolution claim may be preferable to an
71 Bamco 18 v. Reeves, 717 F. Supp. 143, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 923 F. 2d 842
(2d Cir. 1990) (unpublished table opinion).
72 Bamco 18 v. Reeves, No 87 Civ. 5496 (RWS), 1989 WL 135877, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 6, 1989), aff'd, 923 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1990) (unplublished table opinion) (dismissing
general partner's argument that these monies should be paid back to the partnership, not to
the limited partner, noting that the partnership was in bankruptcy and that the issue was not
properly before the court).
73 Thirty-nine states give an LLC member the right to request dissolution. Typical are
those states which have adopted UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY Co. ACT § 8.01(b)(5) (1995),

which does not require the action to be derivative and provides:
A limited liability company is dissolved, and its business must be wound up, upon the
occurrence of any of the following events:
(5) on application by a member or a dissociated member, upon entry of a judicial decree
that:
(i) the economic purpose of the company is likely to be unreasonably frustrated;
(ii)another member has engaged in conduct relating to the company's business that
makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the company's business with that
member;
(iii)it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the company's business in
conformity with the articles of organization and the operating agreement;
(iv)the company failed to purchase the petitioner's distributional interest as required by
Section 7.01; or
(v)the managers or members in control of the company have acted, are acting, or will
act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the
petitioner; ... ;
cf N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Ramco Holding Corp., 938 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (stating
that in an action to dissolve a limited partnership, partnership must be joined as an
indispensable party because the alleged injuries are the fruits of the partnership and parties
chose to structure their business creating a separate legal entity; in exchange for limited
liability, limited partners give up the right to bring direct claims); Sax v. World Wide Press,
Inc., 809 F.2d 610, 616 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that because the misapplication or waste of
corporate assets is a corporate injury, an action to dissolve a corporation brought by a
shareholder must be brought derivatively).
74 Muirfield (Del.), L.P. v. Pitts, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 600, 608 (W.D. La. 1998).
75 Allright Mo., Inc. v. Billeter, 829 F.2d 631, 635 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that
dissolution may force the partner to terminate a profitable investment and incur costly taxes
and that the process may be slower than a derivative suit).
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accounting action, which the court felt could be ineffective if there was
ongoing malfeasance by those in control.76
Sometimes the court simply finds that the Uniform Partnership
Act grants
78
standing 77 -as could provisions of the applicable LLC act.
If the general partner breaches fiduciary duties in "roll-up" transactions
whereby the limited partners receive less than what they are entitled to, the
courts have uniformly concluded that the limited partners are directly injured. 9

76

Id.

77 DM II, Ltd. v.

Hosp. Corp. of Am., 130 F.R.D. 469, 471-72 (N.D. Ga. 1989)

In addition, because § 14-8-22 [UPA § 22] provides a cause of action to enforce §
14-8-21 to "any partner," the court finds that the controlling substantive law vests the
right of action in each partner independent of the partnership. The court therefore
concludes that each partner is a real party in interest to this action ....
1d; Ebest v. Bruce, 734 S.W.2d 915, 925 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
78 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4228(l)(b)(4) (West Supp. 2003) (recognizing that
a member may bring an action directly against a manager or managing member who failed to
perform his duties in conscious disregard of the best interest of the LLC or engaged in
willful misconduct); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.4515 (Lexis 2002) (authorizing
members to sue other members or managers for illegal, fraudulent, and willfully unfair and
oppressive acts; permitting any relief appropriate, including dissolution, damages, injunctive
remedies, and a forced repurchase of the injured member's interest); UNIFORM LTD. LAB.
Co. ACT § 410 (1995) (stating that member may bring an action against another member to
enforce his rights under the operating agreement or act); see generally Charles W. Murdock,
Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the 1990s: Legislative and Case Law
Developments and Their Implicationsfor the Future, 56 Bus. LAW 499 (2001) (containing a
detailed state-by-state analysis of the fiduciary duty provisions in the various state LLC
statutes and a criticism of the Uniform Act provisions; suggesting, on page 527, that the
Uniform Act may provide that members owe no duties to each other).
79 Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 721 F.2d 59, 67 n.8 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that
derivative suit would seem inappropriate in a roll-up transaction where plaintiff's claim is
not an injury to the partnership but to the limited partners); Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley
Petroleum Co., 808 F. Supp. 1037, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that limited partners
stated a direct breach of fiduciary duty claim, not a derivative claim, in alleging that the
general partners issued a false prospectus used to obtain the limited partner votes, which
were exercised to give the general partners an improper larger share of the converted entity
to the detriment of the limited partners; the harm alleged was not harm to partnership, but to
the limited partners themselves); Fleck v. Cablevision VII, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 622, 628-629
(D. Colo. 1991) (noting that the limited partners, who were required to tender their interests,
stated a direct breach of fiduciary claim in alleging that the general partner did not take into
account the best interests of the limited partners and did not make adequate disclosure in
regard to an earlier vote; allegations of failure to obtain the highest price for the limited
partner interests asserted a breach of contract claim because the partnership agreement had a
provision governing the purchase price); Tr. of Gen. Elec. Pension Trust v. Levenson, Civ.
A. No. 12,014, 1992 WL 41820 (Del. Ch. Mar. 3, 1992) (holding that general partners
breach their duties of loyalty and fair dealing owed to limited partners by converting the
partnership to a corporation because the new corporation would insure the former general
partners control of the business and increase the general partner's ownership from 25% to
61%); Sturm v. Marriott Marquis Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff'd, 85 F.
Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (concluding that limited partners' direct breach of fiduciary
duty claims challenging a roll-up should survive motion to dismiss); Angeles/Quinoco Sec.
Corp. v. Collison, 841 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App. 1992) (class certified); R.S.M. Inc. v. Alliance
Capital Mgmt. Holdings L.P., No. 17449, 2001 WL 379573 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2001)
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The

limited

partner

may

have

sufficiently

pled

the

unfairness

of a

reorganization by asserting that the general partner was to receive additional
Similarly, if the general partners cheat the
fees after the reorganization.
limited partners in computing or in making distributions, the courts may
conclude that the action is direct. 81 Limited partners (or defrauded LLC
members) often lose much more when the general partner merely steals from
the partnership (prior to making any distributions). But in these theft cases,
courts may require the limited partners to sue derivatively even though they
have effectively been harmed in the same way. 8 2 However, there are cases

which recognize that, when the general partner steals from the partnership, it is
83
the limited partners who are injured and who have standing to bring a claim.

(denying defendants' motions to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty and disclosure claims in a
class-action challenging partnership organization). Compare Hoffman Elec. Inc. v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 754 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (granting limited partners class certification in
direct claim that general partners fraudulently caused sale of all partnership assets at too low
a price); 7547 Corp. v. Parker & Parsley Dev. Partners, L.P., 38 F.3d 211, 220-22 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding that general partners' allocation to themselves of more shares than they were
entitled to, non-arms-length transactions with affiliates, as improper receipt of millions of
dollars of management fees in roll-up, and other breaches all stated derivative claims).
so In re Boston Celtics Ltd. P'ship S'holders Litig., No. C.A. 16511, 1999 WL 641902,
at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 6, 1999) (finding, however, that the limited partners failed to allege
specific facts which would demonstrate that their equity had been diluted).
81 Reeve v. Folly Hill Ltd. P'ship, 628 N.E.2d 36 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (deducting
improper cost overruns from profits before computing limited partners' distributions).
82 Blasberg v. Oxbow Power Corp., 934 F. Supp. 21, 28 (D. Mass. 1996) ("In contrast
to Reeve, the injury in this case is a diminution of the value of the assets of the Partnership
due to excessive payouts to third parties, rather than a diminution of the value of
distributions to the Limited Partner as an investor."); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Ramco Holding
Corp., 938 F. Supp. 754, 757 (N.D. Okla. 1996).
NYL alleges that RAMCO breached its fiduciary duties under the Partnership
Agreement by "wrongfully overcharging millions of dollars in 'tech time,"'...
overcharging and miscalculating management fees .... and diverting oil sales "service
fees".... In addition, NYL claims that RAMCO wrongfully retained interest
income ... the proceeds of oil and gas sales.... a "six-figure take-or-pay
settlement",... and a "seven figure 'advance to operator,"'.... NYL further contends
that RAMCO commingled Partnership funds with RAMCO funds.... Based upon
these and other allegations by NYL, the Court concludes that this is a clear case of a
limited partner asserting a derivative claim against a general partner. Any injury
incurred by NYL as a result of RAMCO's alleged wrongdoing is merely a by-product
of the harm to the Partnership itself
Id.
83 Cagan v. W. Suburban Bank, No. 90 C 5582, 1992 WL 80966, at *3 (N.D. I11.Apr.
15, 1992) (stating that where partnership was looted, the investors bore the real brunt of the
wrongdoing and had standing); In re Estate of Brandt, 440 N.Y.S.2d 189, 197 (App. Div.
1981) (holding that limited partners have standing to directly seek redress through an
accounting for alleged diversion of partnership assets by general partners); Seidel v. Lee, No.
CIV. A. 93-494-JJF, 1994 WL 913930, at *5 (D. Del. Oct. 14, 1994) (holding that plaintiff
alleged individual injury resulting from nine transactions in which defendants were unjustly
enriched and sought recessionary, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as an
accounting; given the limited partner's injury, the nature of the wrongs alleged were
characterized as individual); Gagan v. Am. Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that when the general partner and affiliates looted the partnership, failed to make
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In one case, the limited partner claimed that the general partner had sold all of
the assets of various partnerships to an entity controlled and owned solely by

the general partner for inadequate consideration-essentially as a way to get rid

of the limited partner's interest in the investment. 84 The limited partner brought
both a derivative claim, ,arguing that this action was a misappropriation of
partnership property and an usurpation of a partnership opportunity,? 5 and also
a direct claim, arguing that there was a conspiracy to deprive her of the value of
her interests in the limited partnerships. 86 The court agreed that there was a

disclosures, and repurchased all but one limited partnership unit using fraudulent means, the
sole remaining limited partner had standing to bring direct RICO and breach of fiduciary
duty actions seeking personal damages; noting that the partnership being defunct, this would
be the only suit to redress the wrongs); Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners,
L.P., No. Civ. A. 15754-NC, 1998 WL 832631, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 1998) (concluding
that allegations that the general partner had used various "improper" ways to acquire more
units and thus dilute the limited partner's voting power gave rise to a direct injury). In
Gotham Partners,the "wrongful" acquisitions involved redemptions after a reverse unit
split, granting of options, odd lot repurchases, and simple open market repurchases. Id. The
actions impinged upon the unit holder's right to terminate the general partner and were a
specific injury to the unit holders as a class as opposed to a harm inflicted upon the limited
partnership. Id. But the court concluded that the limited partner's other complaint that the
general partner had purchased some of these shares from the partnership itself at too low a
price stated a derivative claim. Id.; see also Fulco v. Am. Cable Sys., Civ. A. Nos. 89-1342S, 89-1380-S & 89-14228-S, 1989 WL 205356 at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 4, 1989). In Fulco, a
direct injury to the partners was asserted when general partner allegedly sold all the
partnership assets at too low a price. Id. Limited partners had not tendered their units. Id
Plaintiffs also stated a securities claim under the forced seller doctrine. Id.; Hirsch v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 72 F. 3d 1085, 1094 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that only limited partners may
bring claim against partnership accountant and that trustee of general partner precluded from
bringing claim because it is the limited partners who seek recovery from accountants and
lawyers; because general partner is financially distressed, any recovery will inure in toto to
the limited partners who are the real creditors); Sender v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 952
P.2d 779, 781 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (noting class action brought by 1,600 limited partners
against general partner and secondary defendants where partnerships were merely ponzi
schemes run by the general partner). Compare Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 218 (Ohio
1989).
Claims of breach of fiduciary duty alleged by minority shareholders against
shareholders who control a majority of shares in a close corporation, and use their
control to deprive minority shareholder of the benefits of their investment, may be
brought as individual or direct actions and are not subject to the provisions of Civ.R.
23.1.
Id.
84 Haydinger v. Freedman, No. Civ. A. 98-3045, 2000 WL 748055, at *7-*10 (E.D. Pa.
June 8, 2000).
85 Id. at *9. The court concluded that the limited partner had shown sufficient evidence
that the general partner
breached a fiduciary duty of care or loyalty to the limited partners by selling the
underlying real estate for inadequate consideration, self-dealing by contracting for
services in exchange for inappropriate consideration, and/or usurping corporate
opportunities by not offering the underlying properties for sale on the open market.
Id. (emphasis added).
86 Id. at *7.
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direct claim: that the general partner's
87 actions consituted an attempt to

eliminate her interest in the partnerships.
Very importantly, and as a major difference from the corporation setting,
misappropriation of funds (or other similar wrongful acts) by those in charge of
an LLC or partnership does not merely injure the entity and only "indirectly"
reduces the value of the member's investment. In both the LLC and limited
partnership, any misappropriation, usurpation of a business opportunity, or

similar wrongful behavior immediately reduces the capital account of the
member or partner, very much a "direct" injury to the owner. 88 In a number of
cases, the court has recognized that such wrongdoing does directly reduce the
plaintiffs' capital accounts, justifying a direct claim by the individual. 89 A

" Id. at *10.
B. Freedman's personal claims are distinct from those asserted derivatively. B.
Freedman's personal claims are for the harm caused by R. Haydinger's attempts to
eliminate B. Freedman's interest in the partnerships. B. Freedman's derivative claims
are for the reduction in value of the limited partnerships caused by R. Haydinger's
conduct. There is a difference between the value of the limited partnerships and the
physical shares B. Freedman held in those partnerships; R. Haydinger's alleged attempt
to eliminate B. Freedman's ownership interest in the partnership shares can be the basis
of a direct claim. B Freedman's direct claims are not barred.
Id.

88 See generally Goldstein & Price, L.C. v. Tonkin & Mondl, L.C., 974 S.W.2d 543,
552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that an LLC "member's capital account fluctuates daily
until his withdrawal becomes effective and the books close" and that a wrongful withdrawal
or usurpation by a manager would have a direct and immediate effect on the injured
member's capital); Kazanjian v. Rancho Estates, Ltd., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 535 (Ct. App.
1991) (stating that if the general partner personally borrows money and encumbers the
partnership real estate so that when the land is sold there will not be enough funds to repay
the limited partner's capital (or any profits), the general partner is liable not only derivatively
to the partnership but to the limited partner because the misappropriated sums directly
caused the limited partners's loss); In re Estate of Brandt, 440 N.Y.S.2d 189, 196 (App. Div.
1981) (holding that limited partners have standing to complain of waste and diversion of the
partnership assets which affect the partners' capital accounts and if unchecked could lead to
the ultimate loss of the partners' capital investment); Brooke v. Mt. Hood Meadows Or.,
Ltd., 725 P.2d 925 (Or. Ct. App. 1986), affd, 732 P.2d 36 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing
the concepts of capital accounts, capital contributions, and retention of partnership profits).
Compare Companion v. Parkview Apartments, 588 N.W.2d 897 (S.D. 1999) (holding that
direct claim that general partner had incorrectly categorized reserve funds as primarily
distributable to itself rather than to the limited partners); PB Real Estate, Inc. v. DEM II
Props., 719 A.2d 73 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (stating that profits and distributions belong to
LLC members for purposes of levy by charging order); Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, L.P.,
No. Civ. A. 18519, 2001 WL 1018760 (Del. Ch. Aug. 23, 2001) (deciding that limited
partners stated cause of action that defendants' actions reduced the value of their capital
accounts when defendants arguably wrongly issued additional interests to other partners and
affiliates); cf Diamond Parking Inc. v. Frontier Bldg. Ltd. P'ship, 864 P.2d 954 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993) (finding that limited partner was unable to prove that reduction in its capital
account from $1.5 million to $56,250 was due to breaches of fiduciary duty by general
partner).
89 See, e.g., Shinn v. Thrust IV, Inc., 786 P.2d 285 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing
limited partner to directly sue general partner for $70,000 reduction in value of capital
account due to cost overruns attributable to general partner's breaches); In re USACafes,
L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1991) (describing a class action suit brought by limited
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limited partner may be entitled in a, direct suit against the general partner to
have the general partner's share of profits reduced if the general partner has not
performed the duties required in the partnership--thus directly increasing the
limited partner's share of profits, its capital account, and the amount available
for distribution to it. 90 Over thirty years ago, a New York appellate decision
noted that there is a long line of cases which do not equate or analogize limited
partners to shareholders and, if one of the partners fraudulently disposes of

partners who sought to recover the reduction in value of units when the general partners
allegedly sold all of the partnership assets too cheaply); Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 59 (Ct. App. 1975) (holding that general partners engaged in self-dealing and diversion
of funds were directly liable to limited partners whose capital accounts were reduced from
$1,125,000 to $335,000); Gagan v. Am. Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 957-58 (7th Cir.
1996) (noting that the jury agreed that the limited partner had sustained $526,500 damages to
his capital through the misuse of partnership funds by those in control); Hommel v. George,
802 P.2d 1156 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (describing limited partners' complaints that sought
repayment of their respective capital contributions and lost profits); Lawson v. Tax Lien Res.
Group, LLC, No. 98 C 245, 1998 WL 957331 (N.D. I11.Dec. 15, 1998) (allowing former
LLC member to directly sue her former co-members and the LLC, alleging that they had
wrongfully withheld her share of profits and other compensation); Malekzadeh v. Wyshock,
611 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. Ch. 1992) (noting that, because of wrongdoing by general partner,
arbitrator reduced general partner's capital account by 6 2/3% and directed appointment of
an accountant to reconcile the capital accounts of the three partners); Newburger, Loeb &
Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1076 n.22, 1081 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that improper transfer
of partnership assets amounted to a conversion of the limited partners' capital accounts;
general partners liable in an action for an accounting for value of the capital accounts);
Reeve v. Folly Hill Ltd. P'ship, 628 N.E.2d 36 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (requiring limited
partner's share of profits to be recalculated when general partner improperly paid funds to its
affiliate, reducing limited partner's share of profits); Drucker v. Mige Assoc. II, 639
N.Y.S.2d 365 (App. Div. 1996) (finding that general partner's unwarranted demands would
have reduced the amounts available for the other partners); Nowotny v. Atkins, Nos. 8480427-BKC-3P7, 86-240, 84-191, 1997 WL 375732, at *11 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. June 16,
1997) (holding that limited partners who established damages were entitled to recover
against general partner for misappropriation of partnership funds; no discharge in
bankruptcy); cf Gefnan, 2001 WL 1018760, at *3 (stating that plaintiffs alleged that
defendant's action in improperly restructuring partnership greatly reduced the value of
limited partners' capital accounts); In re Boston Celtics Ltd. P'ship S'holders Litig., No. C.A.
16511, 1999 WL 641902, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 6, 1999) (concluding that limited partners
failed to plead specific facts demonstrating how their equity was diluted). Contra Katell v.
Morgan Stanley Group, Inc., Civ. A. No. 12343, 1993 WL 205033, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 8,
1993) (finding that sale of partnership assets at inadequate price does not justify claims that
individual capital accounts were damaged; rather this is an indirect injury to the partners as a
result of a wrong done to the partnership); Sussman v. Paradigm Partners, Inc., No. 91 CIV
2891 (KMW), 1993 WL 410460 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993) (noting that the limited partners
directed that $2,000,000 of their investment be allocated to the "low risk" "sleeve" (i.e.,
portfolio) of the partnership and that, arguably due to general partner's breach of duty of
care, the funds were not so invested and the entire investment was lost; concluding the
wrongs were to the partnership and limited partners were required to bring their claim
derivatively).
90 Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the
general partner is not entitled to a 50% share of profits because it failed to develop the
partnership property as required in the partnership agreement; the general partner merely
sold the property and thus was entitled only to a quantum meruit share of profits).
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partnership property, each partner, limited or general, is wronged and should
sue directly for the damages he sustained. 91
Although the Delaware Chancery Court has recently concluded that there
is absolutely no reason to require compliance with the derivative rules when the
breach of fiduciary duty arises during the winding up of the partnership, 92 why
should the rule be different merely because the partnership is in wind-up? The
partnership is no less an entity than it was before dissolution. 93 More
importantly, the
injury to the partner or LLC member is just as direct in either
94
circumstance.

91 Millard v. Newmark & Co., 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 262 (App. Div. 1966); Mannaberg v.
Herbst, 45 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aft'd, 47 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 1944),
aft'd, 56 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1944).
The fact that a partnership instead of a corporation was involved does not make the
facts alleged any less a wrong, but the difference between the relations existing between
corporations and their stockholders with respect to corporate property and the relations
existing between partners with respect to partnership property very well may be
regarded as making a difference with respect to who is regarded as having been
wronged; and, while authority to the contrary may be found, it has been distinctly
adjudged in this State that where one partner and a third person join in a fraudulent
disposition of partnership property the wrong is done not to the firm but to each partner
separately and that each not only may but must sue alone for such damage as he has
sustained.
Id.; see also Gagan, 77 F.3d at 960 (stating that cases finding that shareholders must sue
derivatively are "inapposite").
92 In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P., No. C.A. 14634, 2000 WL 130629, at *6
(Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2000).
Plaintiffs argue that because they seek relief from the general partner's actions the
imposition of derivative and demand requirements exalts the partnership form over the
substance of this intra-partnership dispute. I agree with plaintiffs. With the partnership
in dissolution the "partnership" entity is simply an artifice representing the relationship
between two legally juxtaposed parties and is no longer relevant as a distinct legal
creature for the purpose of resolving the final claims between these parties.
Id.
93 Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999) (holding that
dissolution does not prevent partnership from maintaining an action, thus limited partners do
not have the right to pursue their derivative claims directly).
94 Cf. Cencom Cable, 2000 WL 130629, at *5.
I find this case quite different from Litman v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc., in
which Vice Chancellor Chandler found a claim alleging diminution of value of
partnership units in an ongoing partnership to be derivative. In the present case, the
partnership is not ongoing, but is ended [actually, being wound up]. Once the enterprise
is terminated and the fiduciaries have acted to wind up the finances of the enterprise,
the demand rule's purposes become irrelevant. To now classify these claims as
derivative, purely as a matter of form, and to institute "demand analysis" only serves to
impede efficient and final resolution of the remaining claims against those fiduciaries.
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2. Cases Specifically Recognizing the Right of an LLC Member to Sue
Directly

Although there are not yet many cases involving LLCs, a number of those
that exist recognize the right of the LLC member to directly sue another
member for breach of fiduciary duties. 95 One court held that LLC members
could sue another member for breach of a noncompetition agreement because
all of them signed the LLC operating agreement. 96 In the same case, the court
remanded for a full and complete hearing as to whether the individual members
could bring a direct claim for breach of contract and fiduciary duty, which
apparently would depend on whether the court concluded that the members had
been directly injured.9 7
In Connecticut, one member directly sued the other two (and the LLC)
when they failed to pay him his share of the profits. 98 In this direct action by
one member against the
other two, the so-called "fiduciary shield" did not
99
protect the defendants.
In another case, one member of an LLC (and the LLC itself) sued a second
member, who apparently failed to make the required capital contribution and
failed to meet the responsibilities imposed by the operating agreement.,00 The
member and LLC directly alleged (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of covenant
95 Arifin v. Schude, No. 98 C 1591, 1999 WL 342395 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1999)
(holding that, in a breach of the duty of loyalty case, if one member misappropriates LLC
funds, the other has a right to bring a direct claim); cf Lawson v. Tax Lien Res. Group, LLC,
No. 98 C 245, 1998 WL 957331 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1998). Although the court in Lawson did
not specifically rule on the question as to whether a member could sue directly for breach of
duty, a former member of the LLC did directly sue both the LLC and the other two members
alleging that the two members, Baurle and Tabor (1) owed her a formal accounting for their
operation and management of TLRG (the LLC), (2) wrongfully withheld $18,000 in
compensation for services that she rendered for TLRG, and (3) wrongfully withheld her
portion of TLRG profits, an amount in excess of $100,000. Id.; Elf Atochem, Inc. v. Jaffari,
727 A.2d 286, 293 (Del. 1999) (refuting the argument that the LLC is not bound by an
arbitration clause in the operating agreement because the LLC did not sign the document: "It
is the members who are the real parties in interest. The LLC is simply their joint business
vehicle. This is the contemplation of the statute in prescribing the outline of a limited
liability company agreement.").
96 Walker v. Virtual Packaging, LLC, 493 S.E.2d 551, 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that members could sue each other on noncompetition agreement because each
"individually" signed the operating agreement containing the covenant).
97

Id.

98 Worms v. WGB Partners, L.L.C., No. CV 9501491825, 1996 WL 571464 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 1996).
'9 Id. at *3.
According to the allegations in this case, plaintiff is suing the defendants as individuals
regarding agreements that defendants personally breached and torts that they personally
committed. He is not suing as a third-party to recover on an agreement entered into
between himself and a company through its agents.
Id.
1to Taurus Advisory Group, Inc. v. Sector Mgmt., Inc., No. CV 960150830, 1996 WL
502187 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug 29, 1996), aff'd, 1997 WL 241153 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 6,
1997).
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of good faith, (3) negligent misrepresentation, and (4) breach of fiduciary duty.
The defendant argued that the individual member had no standing to sue
directly, had not met the derivative requirements, and that the LLC itself could
not sue because the suit was not properly authorized by the members. Applying
corporate principles by analogy, the court essentially concluded that the
member could directly bring both a claim for breach of contract and a claim for
breach of the covenant of good faith. The court concluded that the test was
whether the member suffered either an injury separate from other members or
an injury separate from the LLC-'a wrong involving a contractual right of a
shareholder which exists independently of any right of the corporation." 1 The
court concluded that the member suffered a separate injury because it had to
bear extra expenses of the
LLC and had to discontinue other business activities
10 2
in order to run the LLC.
However, apparently because of lack of careful pleading, the court
dismissed the plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty: "The complaint
does not state an individual cause of action in favor of TAG [member] for
breach of fiduciary relationship."1' 0 3 Query: if this had been articulated in the
complaint, would the claim have survived this motion to dismiss? It would
seem so.
In a very similar situation, the Second Circuit, overruling the district court,
concluded that an LLC member had plead a direct cause of action in its
allegations involving the failure of another member to make a required capital
contribution. 04 The plaintiff member alleged that, because the defendant failed
to make its required capital contribution, the plaintiff member was obligated to
make additional contributions (which were not repaid),
thus constituting a
05
direct loss and direct injury to the contributing member.'
The confusion and the often inconsistent decisions in breach of fiduciary
duty disputes among LLC members is clearly demonstrated in a series of cases
involving essentially the two members of an LLC. Each brought separate suits

"'1 Id. at *2.
102 Id. at *2.

TAG [member] appears to be alleging that because the members did not contribute the
capital and their services, TAG had to take over the operations at the expense of its own
operations. This is a direct injury to the plaintiff, and accordingly the plaintiff can bring

the suit on its own behalf.

Id. 103Id. at *3 (noting that in the corporate context, a breach of fiduciary duty is a wrong
to the entity, a claim that the shareholder may only bring derivatively).
104Excimer Assoc., Inc. v. Cabrini Dev. Council, 292 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2002).
'o' Id.at 140.
LCA [plaintiff member] appears to claim that as a result of PC's [defendant member]
breach of the Operating Agreement, LCA contributed $495,218.93 over and above that
which it was contractually obligated to pay, and it is now seeking to recover that
amount from PC. Such a claim would seek recovery for a direct injury to LCA that is
independent of any injury Excimer [the LLC] may have suffered.
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against the other claiming various breaches of the duty of loyalty.' 0 6 The trial
10 7
judge in one action concluded that one member could sue another directly;
but in the companion cases, different trial judges concluded that such claims
must be brought derivatively.10 8 In fact, one judge concluded that there was no
way one member could sue another even derivatively, because derivative
claims were not authorized 1 9-a conclusion that the Supreme Court ultimately
reversed.
Similar to various partnership cases, in some LLC litigation there has been
no challenge that a claim by one member against another for breach of
fiduciary duty may be brought directly and not derivatively." In a case
106 Halley v. Barnabe,

24 P.3d 140 (Kan. 2001) (there were actually three separate

actions between the two members).
107 Id. at 142.
108 Id.
109 Id.

110 Cogniplex, Inc. v. Ross, No. 00 C 7463, 00 C 7933, 2001 WL 436210 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 27, 2001). In action 00 C 7933, the defendant member did not challenge the other two
members' right to directly claim that he had breached the LLC contract, converted LLC
assets, breached duties of loyalty, and that plaintiffs were entitled to an accounting. Id The
court noted that because the parties did not have an operating agreement, any final
determination on whether plaintiffs stated a breach of contract claim would depend on
whether the parties had actually structured their LLC similar to a partnership-binding each
other in a contract of mutual agency, rather than similar to a corporation, which does not
impose any contractual obligations among the owners. Id.; Carson v. Lynch Multimedia
Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1264 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting that defendants argued that some
claims had to be brought derivatively, but failed to object to plaintiffs claims that the
defendants had breached fiduciary duties and had oppressed the minority member by
essentially terminating it from its management position; plaintiff stated cause of action that
one member owed direct fiduciary duties to other member); Lynch Multimedia Corp. v.
Carson Communications, L.L.C., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (D. Kan. 2000) (involving one
member directly alleging second member usurped LLC opportunity); Flippo v. CSC Assoc.
III, L.L.C., 547 S.E.2d 216 (Va. 2001). In Flippo, the manager (one of the three members)
purported to transfer all of the LLC's assets to a joint venture, which action would have
caused the LLC to dissolve. Id. The court found that this was a breach of fiduciary duty and
permitted both direct and derivative claims. Id. The court awarded actual damages, $350,000
in punitive damages, and attorney fees; removed the manager-member; and inserted the
third-member plaintiff as the new manager. Id. The court did not identify which, if any,
awards were made directly to the plaintiff member in respect to its direct claims. Id.
Interestingly, the defendants had structured their actions on the advice of highly respected
legal counsel. Id.; Palmer v. Moffat, No. 01C-03-114-JEB, 2001 WL 1221749 (Del. Super.
Ct. Oct. 10, 2001). Palmer, a member, brought a direct action against all of the other
members alleging that Moffat, another member, withheld capital contributions which he was
obligated to make, and encouraged the other members and managers to do the same. Id. As a
result, the company defaulted on its financings and Moffat was able to buy the assets of the
LLC at a private auction. Id. Palmer, the plaintiff, received nothing from the proceeds of the
sale. Id. Palmer alleged that the other members and managers thus conspired to defraud him
of more than $15 million of his equity interest in the LLC. Id.; VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No.
C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000), aft'd, 2001 WL 760856 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2001) (allowing recovery for member in a direct counterclaim against other
member for breach of duty of loyalty and disclosure); Sun v. Li, No. 99-1356, 1999 WL
1054148, (4th Cir. Nov. 22, 1999) (allowing recovery for sole member of LLC for funds that
were diverted from his LLC by defendants); cf Maas Tech., Inc. v. Henning, 744 So. 2d 238
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prohibiting the LLC's former lawyer from representing one of the two members
in a dispute between the two, there was the implicit recognition that although

the plaintiff member's claims were brought both directly and derivatively, this
was simply a fight between the two members, with the plaintiff alleging that the

defendant had breached fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiff member."'I
Similarly, a California appellate court recognized that because the members

formed their LLC merely as a "joint venture" to acquire certain real property, in
a direct action by both the LLC and the other two members against the third
member who usurped the opportunity to the exclusion of the other two, if the
plaintiffs could prove their claims, the court would impose a constructive trust
on the property and require the defendant member to convey to the "plaintiffs"
the share of the legal title "plaintiffs" would2 have acquired had not the
defendant breached its duties toward plaintiffs. 1
The importance of the language of the state's LLC statute is clearly
demonstrated in another case in which the court found that in a two-member3

LLC, one could sue the other for general breach of fiduciary claims."

Although other factors were important in the court's conclusion that one

member could directly sue another (statute did not grant immunity; 114 members5
have a duty to account and have no right to appropriate LLC property;"

operating agreement obligated members to perform their duties

16

), the factor

which seemed most important was that the Pennsylvania LLC statute has a

somewhat unique provision which states that in a member-run LLC, the

(La. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that claim by member that merger of LLC effected a
conversion of his interests was a direct action against the other member; requiring arbitration
because the defendant and plaintiff both signed the operating agreement which contained an
arbitration clause). Compare Froelich v. Erickson, 96 F. Supp. 2d 507, 526 (D. Md. 2000)
("It is clear that Erickson, as a majority interest holder, owed a fiduciary duty to the minority
interest holders... In addition, as a director of SCL [LLC], Erickson owed a fiduciary duty
to the Members. Nonetheless, no reasonable jury could conclude that Erickson breached
these duties."), aff'd, 781 A.2d 696 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished table opinion).
111 Patrick v. Ressler, No. OOAP-1194, 2001 WL 1142357 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28,
2001).
112 BGJ Assocs., LLC v. Super. Ct., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).
113 Harbor Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. GEM Laundry Servs., L.L.C., No. 4830 July Term
2000, 2001 WL 1808556, at *9-*11 (Pa. Com. P1. July 18, 2001).
1" Id. at *10 (holding that statutory language that members are not liable "solely by
reason of being a member" does not connote that members are immune from liability in all
circumstances, but means that members are not liable simply because of their status as
members).
15 Id. (finding that in a member-managed LLC, statute states that the members must
account to the company for any benefit and hold as trustees any profits derived by them
without the consent of the others; even if members are not managing the LLC, official
statutory comments state that a member has no right to appropriate LLC property).
116 Id. at *11 (quoting operating agreement: "Each Member shall be obligated to
perform all promises and covenants .... ).
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members are to be treated aspartners.17 Thus,
like partners, one member can
18
sue another for breach of fiduciary duties.
Although not a breach of fiduciary duty case, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals recently held that one of two members of a professional LLC (dental
practice) could directly sue the contractors who designed the LLC's dental
office and facilities. 1 9 The design group argued that the LLC as an entity (the
owner of the office) was the real party in interest and, thus, was the only proper
plaintiff. The court disagreed, pointing out that if a special duty is owed to the
member of the business, the member may directly enforce that duty-which
may be created by contract. The court noted that here the member's claims did
not allege any injuries to the LLC; the record contained no evidence that the
LLC was injured; and most importantly, there was an individual contract
between the member and the design group that was allegedly breached. Thus,
the member was the real party in interest."' The court noted that even if the
LLC really was injured (as presumably it must have been), "[p]laintiff s
individual contract with Defendants creates a 'special duty' running from
Defendants to Plaintiff."''
Not surprisingly, there is already at least one opinion in which the court
concluded that the cause of action for diversion of business and conversion of
assets belonged to the LLC, not to the members. 12 2 However, at least one court
concluded that this holding is based on the unique aspect of Michigan law, and
thus would not be applicable in Pennsylvania. 123 A New York Federal District
opinion, likewise applying traditional tests discussed in section II.A of this
Article, concluded that breach of fiduciary claims among LLC members should

117Id at *10 (noting that 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8904 (a)(1) provides that if the LLC
is managed by members, as was here, they shall be treated as general partners).
1i

Id at*10-*1].

These sections, taken together, authorize this court to look to principles of partnership
law and/or corporate law. Under the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), a partner is
accountable to the partnership as a fiduciary for the profits derived by him without
consent of the other partners in the conduct of the partnership or from any use of the
partnership's property... The UPA also applies to limited liability companies. 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 831 1(b). Further, partners stand in a fiduciary relationship to each
other....
Id.
119Dawson, D.D.S. v. Atlanta Design Assoc., Inc., 551 S.E. 2d 877 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001).
121 Id. at 879.
121 Id. at 880.

122 Int'l Flavors & Textures, LLC v. Gardner, 966 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
123 HarborHosp. Servs., 2001 WL 1808556, at *9
Defendants refer to International Flavors and Textures, L.L.C. v. Gardner, 966 F.
Supp. 552, 554 (W.D. Mich. 1997), for the proposition that a member owes a fiduciary
duty to the limited liability company, but not to its members. Since that case was
interpreting Michigan law on limited liability companies, this court does not find it
helpful or applicable.
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be brought derivatively.' 24 Although the defendants in another case were able
to successfully assert that certain breach of fiduciary duty claims should be
brought derivatively, they failed to make the same argument with respect to
breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by the minority
very similar additional
25
LLC member.'
A California Court of Appeals opinion recently determined that where
three of the LLC members alleged that all of the LLC's assets had been
removed by the other five members from the LLC and transferred twice to

other LLCs in which the plaintiffs had no ownership interest (and which were
apparently controlled by the defendants who had removed the assets), plaintiffs
stated a derivative (but not a direct claim), as against the successor entities who
received the assets.126 The plaintiffs were equally unsuccessful in arguing that,
because the original LLC dissolved, they were also creditors of the LLC and,
according to the LLC dissolution statutes, were "entitled to all remedies
available to, a creditor of the limited liability company," which should include
being able to pursue the wrongdoers directly.12 7 However, although not directly
considered in the opinion, it appears that the plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent
transfer and the like, brought against the individual members who caused the

claims against the entities involved), could be
transfers (in contrast to their
28
brought as direct actions.'

124 Weber v. King, 110 F. Supp. 2d 124 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
125 Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259, 1264 (D. Kan.
2000)
126 PacLink Communications Int'l, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436, 440 (Ct.
App. 2001).
In this case, the essence of plaintiffs' claim is that the assets of PacLink-I were
fraudulently transferred without any compensation being paid to the LLC. This
constitutes an injury to the company itself. Because members of the LLC hold no direct
ownership interest in the company's assets (Corp. Code, § 17300), the members cannot
be directly injured when the company is improperly deprived of those assets. The injury
was essentially a diminution of the value of their membership interest in the LLC
occasioned by the loss of the company's assets. Consequently, any injury to plaintiffs
was incidental to the injury suffered by PacLink- 1.
Id.
127 Id. at 441 (refusing this claim with the following reasoning: "A contextual reading
of their [plaintiff members'] complaint makes clear that they are not suing based upon a
claim that as members of the LLC they were entitled to a distribution which was not made,
but instead are suing for financial injury caused by fraudulent transfer of the company's
assets."). Because the statute also grants them status as creditors, should not they have
whatever rights creditors are entitled to? Why should the cause of the injury have any effect
on their rights, as creditors, to directly pursue a claim?
128 Id. at 438 n. 1 (finding that none of the other defendants raised the defense that the
case had been improperly bought as a direct cause of the action).
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III. THE ALI TEST SHOULD BE APPLIED
A.

Overview of the ALI Approach

Assume that a general partner or LLC member or manager has engaged in
wrongful behavior that is clearly a breach of its fiduciary duty. If fewer than all
the investors bring a direct action to recover for "their" injury, it is possible that
two other groups of claimants will be ignored in this action: First, any creditors
of the LLC orgpartnership, and second, any other investors who are not joined
in the action.
Failure to include these two groups in the lawsuit not only might be
prejudicial to the creditors and other investors, but could expose the defendant
to multiple suits-not an efficient method to resolve disputes. Therefore, in
proceeding with a direct common law breach of fiduciary duty claim or breach
of contract claim, and possibly in proceeding in a manner authorized by
specific statute, the interests of the creditors and other nonjoined investors must
be taken into account. How should this be done?
This same problem, how to protect the creditors and other investors in a
direct suit, arises in the context of the closely held corporation. Generally
speaking, when the types of fiduciary duty breaches described in this Article
have arisen in the corporate context, they have been pursued as derivative
claims. Requiring the plaintiff to use the derivative procedure will likely protect
the creditors 30 and other investors, 131 but as described in section I.B, supra,
the requirement creates additional problems. Therefore, the American Law
Institute (ALI) has, in the corporate context, come up with an alternative
approach that should work equally well with LLC litigation.
ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS section 7.01(d) provides as follows:

129

7547 Corp. v. Parker & Parsley Dev. Partners, L.P., 38 F.3d 211, 221 (5th Cir.

1994) (stating that action should be brought derivatively to protect the LLC's or partnership's

creditors or to provide for proportionate distribution to all members or partners).
130

R.S. Ellsworth, Inc. v. AMFAC Fin. Corp., 652 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Haw. 1982).

Plaintiffs [limited partners] in this case seek monetary damages. In a derivative action,
the monetary award would belong to the partnership, which in turn would remit
payment to the limited partners, according to the present statutory distribution
provisions,. .. under which creditors generally have first priority. If this were a direct
action, any monetary award would accrue directly to the individually named plaintiffs.

Id.
131

Golden Tee, Inc. v. Venture Golf Sch., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 625, 633 (Ark. 1998)

("Also, the monetary damages in a derivative suit belong to the partnership to be distributed
to the limited partners, instead of belonging to those individual partners who bring the
suit."); R.S. Ellsworth, 652 P.2d at 1118
The interests of individual partners are not necessarily identical to the interests of the
limited partnership entity as a whole. If plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with an
individual action, the interests of the limited partnership could be harmed and
defendants could also be open to multiple litigation brought by parties not joined in the

action.
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In the case of a closely held corporation, the court in its discretion may
treat an action raising derivative claims as a direct action, exempt it from
those restrictions and defenses applicable only to derivative action, and
order an individual recovery, if it finds that to do so will not (i) unfairly
expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii)
materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii)
interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested

persons.

132

Although section 7.01(d) does not apply when the action is deemed clearly
direct,133 by incorporating its principles into any direct litigation matter, any
lingering objections to broadly defining what is a direct suit should be
alleviated. Section 7.01(d), adapted for the LLC context, should provide not
only an acceptable solution to the problem of protecting creditors and all
investors, but also a roadmap as to how the litigation should proceed.
Although the ALI approach has still not been widely adopted in the
corporate context, a majority of the states that have considered it have adopted
it. Although just twelve jurisdictions have actually adopted the ALI approach in
the corporate setting,
only nine have rejected it,
with one rejecting state
132

2

A.L.I.,

PRINCIPLES

OF

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE:

ANALYSIS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01(d) (1994).
133 Cf Wulf v. Mackey, 899 P.2d 755, 758 (Or. App. 1995) (finding that § 7.01(d) is a
mechanism by which a court may treat an action raising derivative claims as a direct action;
in a direct action the defendants cannot complain that the action will subject them to
"multiplicity of actions" in violation of § 7.0 1(d), because this section has no application to
direct actions).
134 Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 918 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Thomas v. Dickson,
301 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1983); BBMS, Inc. v. Brown, 306 S.E.2d 288, 290 (Ga. 1983); Caswell
v. Jordan, 362 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (1988); Kirk v. First Nat'l Bank, 439 F. Supp.
1141 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, 561 (Ind. 1995); G & N Aircraft,
Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 234, 236 (Ind. 2001); W & W Equip. Co. v. Mink, 568
N.E.2d 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 647 (Kan. Ct. App.
1994); Brown v. Mailman, No. 95-2181, 1996 WL 42229, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 1996)
(holding, in an unpublished opinion, that the Kansas Supreme Court would not agree with
this appellate opinion and suggesting that at least the court would limit it to freezeout
situations); Orsi v. Sunshine Art Studios, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 471 (D. Mass. 1995) (applying
Massachusetts law); Brown v. Brown, 731 A.2d 1212 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999);
Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1991); Gensemer v. Hallock, 707
N.E.2d 1156 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956)
(applying Oregon law); Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1049, n.5 (Pa. 1997) ("Courts
of the Commonwealth are free to consider other parts of the work [ALI Principles] and
utilize them if they are helpful and appear to be consistent with Pennsylvania law."); Liss v.
Liss, No. 2063, June Term 2001, 2002 WL 576510, at *10 (Pa. Com. P1. Mar. 22, 2002)
(finding a direct claim for oppression in spite of statute which requires claims against
directors to be brought derivatively); Mogilyansky v. Sych, No 3709, Control 121317, 2002
WL 372950, at *1 n.2 (Pa. Com. P1. Feb. 4, 2002) (holding that conditions to apply principle
not met, and plaintiff did not assert principle); Levin v. Schiffman, No. 4442, July Term
2000, 2001 WL 1807922, at *6-*7 (Pa. Com. P1. Feb. 1, 2001); Baron v. Pritzker, No 1574,
Aug. Term 2000, 2001 WL 1855054, at *5 (Pa. Com. P1. Mar. 6, 2001); Warden v.
McLelland, 288 F. 3d 105, 113-114 (3d Cir. 2002) (assuming, but not deciding,
Pennsylvania would apply section 7.01(d)); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14 (L) (Vernon
2003); Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998).
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principle,' 37
having kept the door open.136 Texas has actually codified the
apparently applying it equally to a closely held Texas LLC. 138 In addition, a

A Mississippi case, Derouen v. Marray, 604 So.2d 1086, 1091 n.2 (Miss. 1992), was
cited by Brown, 731 A.2d at 1216, as adopting section 7.01(d), but a closer reading of the
case indicates that the court applied the section 7.01(d) principles to permit a derivative
claim to go forward without compliance with the typical pre-trial procedural prerequisites.
See also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). This case and its
progeny are generally considered as standing for the proposition that what would otherwise
be a derivative action may be pursued as a direct action whenever a closely held corporation
is involved. Id.; Wulf, 899 P.2d at 758 (commenting favorably upon principle); Conk v.
Richards & O'Neil, LLP, 77 F. Supp. 2d 956, 970 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (recognizing that Indiana
applies the principle); Audio Visual Xperts, Inc. v. Walker, No. 17261-NC, 2000 WL
222152, at *2-*3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2000) (applying substantive corporate law of
Pennsylvania, assuming that Pennsylvania would apply section 7.01(d)); cf Arndt v. First
Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999) (recognizing but not applying the
principle when all limited partners were injured in the same manner).
135 Hames v. Cravens, 966 S.W.2d 244 (Ark. 1998). Three dissenting justices, however,
strongly supported the application of section 7.01(d). Id.; River Mgmt. Corp. v. Lodge
Props., Inc., 829 P.2d 398 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916
F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Delaware law); Small v. Sussman, 713 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1999); Frank v. Hadesman & Frank, Inc., 83 F.3d 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (considering
Illinois law); Brown v. Mailman, No. 95 2181, 1996 WL 42229 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 1996);
Blocker v. Meehan, Civ. A. No. 89-2147-0, 1989 WL 134473 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 1989);
Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1999); Davis v. Hamm, 387 S.E.2d 676
(S.C. Ct. App. 1989); Babb v. Rothrock, 401 S.E.2d 418 (S.C. 1991); Todd v. Zaldo, 403
S.E.2d 666 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991); Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1997), aff'd, 583
N.W.2d 643 (S.D.1998); Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666 (Va. 2001); see also Conk v.
Richards & O'Neil, LLP, 77 F. Supp. 2d 956, 969 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (recognizing Illinois has
not yet adopted the principle).
136 Babb, 401 S.E.2d at 419-20 (S.C. 1991). Compare Brown v. Stewart, 557 S.E. 2d
676, 685 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that because two other shareholders not joined,
action would not protect interests of all shareholders).
137 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(L) (Vernon 2003).
L. Closely Held Corporations.
(1). The provisions of Sections B through H of this Article are not applicable to a
closely held corporation. If justice requires:
(a) a derivative proceeding brought by a shareholder of a closely held corporation may
be treated by a court as a direct action brought by the shareholder for his own benefit;
and
(b) a recovery in a direct or derivative proceeding by a shareholder may be paid either
directly to the plaintiff or to the corporation if necessary to protect the interests of
creditors or other shareholders of the corporation.
(2) For purposes of this section, a "closely held corporation" means a corporation:
(a) with less than 35 shareholders; and
(b) that has no shares listed on a national securities exchange or regularly quoted in an
over-the-counter market by one or more members of a national securities association.
Id.
138 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 8.12 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2002),
incorporating by reference, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art 5.14 (Vernon 2003).
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number of states and cases have essentially adopted the
principles espoused in
39
section 7.01 (d) without actually adopting the section.'
B.

Application ofALI Principlesin the LLC and Limited PartnershipContext

The ALI principles apply even more perfectly in the context of a fight
between two members of an LLC or a claim by one or more limited partners
against an at-fault general partner. The Delaware Chancery Court has
recognized this:
In the partnership context, the relationships among the parties may be so
simple and the circumstances so clear-cut that the distinction between
direct and derivative claims becomes irrelevant. I find this to be true
where a partnership is in liquidation and all non-defendant partners in the
resulting litigation constitute a uniform class of limited partners. When
this is the case, superimposing derivative pleading requirements upon
claims needlessly delays ultimate substantive resolution and serves no
useful or meaningful public policy purpose.140

Imposing the many derivative procedural requirements in these situations
improperly exalts form over substance. 141
139 See Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 257, 259 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2000) (listing other states which have essentially adopted these principles); Crosby
v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 218 Syllabus # 3 (Ohio 1989).
Claims of breach of fiduciary duty alleged by minority shareholders against
shareholders who control a majority of shares in a close corporation, and use their
control to deprive minority shareholders of the benefits of their investment, may be
brought as individual or direct actions and are not subject to the provisions of Civ.R.
23.1.
Id.; Noakes v. Schoenborn, 841 P.2d 682, 686-87 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (describing allegations
that defendants took actions which excluded the minority shareholders from the benefits of
participating in the corporation); Steelman v. Mallory, 716 P.2d 1282 (Idaho 1986) (finding
that, where one of three shareholders was squeezed out of a fertilizer application corporation
when the corporation was dissolved and the other two shareholder/directors continued the
business in their own names, defendants usurped the business and plaintiff could sue
directly). Compare Moody v. Betz, No. 01-96-00220-CV, 1998 WL 394312, at *10-*1l
(Tex. App. 1998) (finding that duties ran directly to investor and thus he could recover
damages; concluding that claim not required to be brought by corporation, citing Wingate v.
Hajdik, 795 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. 1990), and Horton v. Robinson, 776 S.W.2d 260, 263
(Tex. App. 1989)).
140 In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P., No.C.A. 14634, 2000 WL 130629, at *3
(Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2000); see also Grigsby & Assoc., Inc. v. Rice Derivative Holdings, L.P.,
No 00 Civ. 5056 (RO), 2001 WL 1135620, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2001) (applying this
Cencom principle to allow one partner to directly sue his other partner); Sender v. Kidder
Peabody & Co., 952 P.2d 779, 781 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that limited
partnerships set up by general partner to accomplish a ponzi scheme had "no functional
existence" outside that of their general partner and thus a trustee had no standing to bring a
claim on behalf of the partnerships against brokerage firms who were alleged to have
participated in the scam, the limited partners having brought a separate direct claim against
the same defendants).
141 Cencom Cable,2000 WL 130629, at *6.
Plaintiffs argue that because they seek relief from the general partners' actions the
imposition of derivative and demand requirements exalts the partnership form over the
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At least one trial court has already applied these ALI principles to allow a
direct claim by one LLC member against another.1 42 Another143indicated that it
would apply ALI principles, but found it unnecessary to do so.
ALI section 7.01(d) accomplishes the same objectives of, or reasons for,
the derivative action, but in a much more efficient and simple way. Four
policies or reasons are often given as to why in certain situations the derivative
suit should be employed: (1) avoidance of multitudinous litigation, (2)
protection of corporate creditors, (3) protection of the interests of all
shareholders, and (4) provision of adequate compensation to the injured
shareholder by increasing the value of the shares when recovery is put back
into the corporation. 144
A.L.I section 7.01(d) incorporates or responds to each of these policies or
reasons. First, section 7.01(d) expressly states that the direct suit is only proper

substance of this intra-partnership dispute. I agree with plaintiffs. With the partnership
in dissolution the 'partnership' entity is simply an artifice representing the relationship
between two legally juxtaposed parties and is no longer relevant as a distinct legal
creature for the purpose of resolving the final claims between these parties. I am not
prone to mechanistic or formalistic application of pleading requirements where doing
so only tends to frustrate efficient claim resolution. "Unless prevented by some positive
and mandatory law, equity regards substance rather than form." I find the claims for
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the partnership agreement are, in substance,
direct claims and may be prosecuted by a class of the limited partners, under Rule
23(b)(1).
Id.

142 Halley v. Bamabe, 24 P.3d 140, 142 (Kan. 2001) ("[A]s a matter of law, Halley
[LLC member] could bring his counterclaims directly even though it [sic] involved
derivative claims, by applying to limited liability companies the closed corporation
derivative exception created in Richards v. Bryan, 19 Kan. App. 2d 950, 879 P.2d 638
(1994)."). The Kansas Supreme Court determined that it was unnecessary to rule whether
this was correct because the Supreme Court authorized the members to bring derivative
claims which the trial courts had determined were not possible. Id.
143 Harbor Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. GEM Laundry Servs., L.L.C., No. 4830 July Term
2000, 2001 WL 1808556, at *11 n.10 (Pa. Com. Pl. July 18, 2001) ("Here, if Harbor's [one
member] claim against Royal PA [other member] is construed as a 'derivative' claim, this
court may treat it as a direct claim because Harbor and Royal PA are the only members of
GEM [the LLC].").
144 Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, 561 (Ind. 1995); see also 7547 Corp. v. Parker &
Parsley Dev. Partners, L.P., 38 F.3d 211, 221 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that action should be
brought derivatively to protect the LLC's or partnership's creditors or to simply avoid
additional litigation from any members or partners who are not joined in the current action);
Cencom Cable, 2000 WL 130629, at *4.
Classifying claims to be derivative has two discernible purposes. First, it ensures that
injury to a whole association is adjudicated on behalf of that whole and not just for the
benefit of the individuals who have undertaken to pursue the claims. Second, it carries
out the desired public policy of galvanizing a governing entity within the business
association into taking action to redress injury on behalf of the business. Demand on the
entity to do so is required unless there is reasonable doubt regarding the entity's
disinterest or valid exercise of business judgment.
Id.; Sloan v. Clark, 277 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413 (N.Y. 1966) (preventing limited partners from
bringing claims, where bankruptcy trustee pursuing identical claims and partnership's
creditors could be prejudiced by limited partners' suit).
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if such will not unfairly expose the entity or the defendants to a multiplicity of
actions. In the typical member claim involving a closely held LLC, this can
easily be accomplished by joining all the members and managers. If all are
joined, there is no possibility for a second suit. 45 In other circumstances, only a
few of the members or partners will desire to pursue the breach of fiduciary
duty claim, in which case joinder of only these, as has been demonstrated in
existing litigation, will as a practical matter likely not "unfairly expose the...
defendant to a multiplicity of actions." 146 If there is a concem that others might
later bring additional suits, the more efficient procedure would be to join all the
members or partners, rather than requiring the plaintiff to refile the claim as a
derivative action.
Second, identical to the "derivative policies," section 7.01(d) expressly
provides that a direct claim may only be brought if it will not materially
prejudice the interests of the business creditors. Typically, this is assured by a

Spiritas v. Robinowitz, 544 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App. 1976) (stating that rule that
claim must be brought in name of partnership, the purpose of which is to protect third parties
from possibility of multiple actions and recoveries, does not apply when both the partners
are joined in the action); Harbor Hosp. Servs., 2001 WL 1808556, at * 1 n.10 ("Here, if
Harbor's [one member] claim against Royal PA [other member] is construed as a 'derivative'
claim, this court may treat it as a direct claim because Harbor and Royal PA are the only
members of GEM [the LLC]."). Compare Audio Visual Xperts, Inc. v. Walker, No 17261NC, 2000 WL 222152, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2000) (holding that direct suit proper because
plaintiff and the two defendants were the only shareholders); Liss v. Liss, No. 2063, June
Term 2001, Control 102951, 2002 WL 576510, at *10 (Pa. Com. P1. Mar. 22, 2002) (finding
that all shareholders were joined and corporation was in liquidation, therefore no risk of
multiplicity of suits); Levin v. Schiffman, No 4442, July Term 2000, 2001 WL 1807922, at
*3 (Pa. Com. Pl. Feb. 1, 2001) (concluding that all shareholders were parties); Baron v.
Pritzker, No. 1574, Aug. Term 2000, 2001 WL 1855054, at *4 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar. 6, 2001)
(finding that there was no danger of a multiplicity of suits because plaintiff and defendant
are the only two shareholders and directors in an action alleging squeeze out and waste of
corporate assets); see also supra note 58 (discussing the reasoning that, if all members or
partners are joined in litigation, partnership or LLC has no separate interest).
146 Osoba v. Bassichis, 679 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. App. 1984) (noting that only seven
of twenty-three limited partners sued, and without explanation; only four were successful
where the court found breaches of duty of care); Jerman v. O'Leary, 701 P.2d 1205, 1209
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that where most limited partners did not complain, plaintiffs
who owned five percent of partnership were directly entitled to five percent of the damages
resulting from the general partner's improper acts that reduced value of partnership); Levin
v. Haas Dev. Corp., No. 87 C 0296, 1987 WL 11355 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1987) (noting that
ten of thirty-six limited partners sued); Bassan v. Inv. Exch. Corp., 524 P.2d 233, 236
(Wash. 1974) (finding wrongdoing in an accounting action brought by two or three limited
partners to challenge profit general partner made on sale of real estate to the partnership;
ordering the profits to be held in trust for the partnership because the remaining twenty-nine
limited partners elected not to join the action); Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks,
896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990) (involving four groups of investors: two sued and two sided
with promoter); Johnson v. J. Hiram Moore, Ltd, 763 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex. App. 1989)
(noting that while two of twenty-five limited partners sued, nineteen others intervened and
specifically denied that the general partner had acted to the detriment of the partnership).
145
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pleading that there are no existing creditors in need of protection or that the
147
existing assets of the business are sufficient to protect the creditors' interests.
Third, both require that any litigation will provide for a fair distribution of
the recovery among all interested persons. If all the members, or at least those
interested in the claim, are joined, this objective will be easily met. 148 One of
the objections to allowing members or partners to sue directly is that the
defendant might be subject to a second derivative claim, and thus subject to
double damages. 149 This risk is eliminated by joining all partners or members
and including a provision in any judgment prohibiting a second derivative
claim.
Finally, the above-stated policies provide that all the investors are
protected by enhancing the value of the business. If the suit is brought directly
with all interested members joined, these investors will actually be better
protected. First, proceeding with a direct claim prevents the defendant general
partner or LLC manager from inappropriately sharing in any recovery.'50
Second, because there often is no market for LLC interests, for the member to
actually realize on her recovery in a derivative claim, she must bring a second
suit to force a liquidation of the business, which may not be desirable.
There are two other reasons sometimes advanced to justify bringing a
claim derivatively rather than directly. Although the ALI principles do not
expressly address either of these concerns, neither applies to a claim by a
member of a closely held LLC or partnership against those in control. First,

147 Cf Audio Visual Xperts, 2000 WL 222152, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2000) (noting
that plaintiff, one of three shareholders, was the principal, if not the only, creditor of the
corporation). Compare Liss, 2002 WL 576510, at *10 (stating that direct action would
protect creditors if defendant shareholder indeed were usurping corporate opportunities);
Baron, 2001 WL 1855054, at *4 (stating that at pleading stage there was no reason to
conclude that allowing a direct action would materially prejudice the interests of creditors);
Levin, 2001 WL 1807922, at *7 ("There is no reason to conclude that allowing a direct
action would materially prejudice the interests of creditors.").
148 Compare Liss, 2002 WL 576510, at *10 (finding that recovery can be decided at
trial and the three shareholders are all named parties and are the only interested persons);
Levin, 2001 WL 1807922, at *7 (Pa. Com. P1. Feb. 1, 2001) (noting that all shareholders
were parties); Baron, 2001 WL 1855054, at *4 (stating that in dispute between two
shareholders alleging squeeze out and waste, allowing direct action would not interfere with
a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons because the complaining
shareholder is the only person who should benefit from the recovery).
149 Compare Kenworthy v. Hargrove, 855 F. Supp. 101, 108 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding
that if general partner is suing on behalf of the partnership, limited partners are prohibited
from bringing second direct suit because limited partners might be improperly entitled to
share in both recoveries), aff'd, 27 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1994).
150 In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P., No. C.A. 14634, 2000 WL 130629, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2000) ("It is an elementary principle of equity that defendants found
liable for breaches of either fiduciary duties or contractual arrangements should not benefit
from any remedy for these breaches. The practical effect of this is to exclude the defendant
from the group of those that may potentially recover."). CompareAudio Visual Xperts, 2000
WL 222152, at *3 (stating that direct suit preferred because plaintiff shareholder was the
only one entitled to recover-"only person who stands to benefit"-in action against other
two shareholders who allegedly misappropriated corporate funds to other corporation).
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derivative suits give management an opportunity to resolve the dispute.
However, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against those in charge of a
closely held LLC can rarely be resolved internally by those in charge (who are
usually the defendants).' 51 Substantial support for this conclusion is found in
the myriad of derivative cases that have concluded that it would be "futile" for
the member or partner to request the defendant and others in control to take
corrective action.1 5 2 If the members or partners had the votes to take action,
they no doubt would have done so. Stated slightly differently, a direct suit in
this context does not interfere with the operation of the business.1 53 Second, in
cases involving publicly traded corporations, derivative procedures are applied
to avoid strike suits. There is no real risk in disputes among members of closely
held businesses raising breach of fiduciary duty claims that the
' 54 action is a strike
suit-a "meritless claim of self-interested decision making."'
151Cencom Cable, 2000 WL 130629, at *5 (concluding that the two reasons for the
demand rule ((I) acting as a gatekeeper to encourage extra judicial intracorporate solutions
to internal problems and (2) barring meritless claims of self-interested decision making)
were not present when all the limited partners were aligned against the general partner, the
partnership was in winding up, and the disputes related to the liquidation of the business).
Compare Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1260 (D. Kan. 2000)
(excusing oppression-based demand for being futile where brought by minority LLC
member on managers controlled by defendant); Dean v. Dick, No. Civ. A. 16566, 1999 WL
413400, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 10, 1999) (recognizing difference between corporate and
partnership setting; noting demand on general partner excused where claim made against it);
Allison Publ'g, Inc. v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 602 N.Y.S.2d 858, 858-59 (App. Div.
1993) (stating that demand on general partner excused where it would have to sue itself);
Audio Visual Xperts, 2000 WL 222152, at *3 (stating that direct suit preferred because
plaintiff, one of three shareholders, is not a stockholder in a large corporation seeking to
usurp the power of the board by bringing claim against other two shareholders who allegedly
misappropriated corporate assets). See generally Dennis Block et al., Derivative Litigation:
Current Law Versus The American Law Institute, 48 Bus. LAW. 1443, 1445 n. 11(1993)
(pointing out differences in litigation involving close corporations lacking independent
directors).
152See, e.g., CCG Assoc. Inc. v. Riverside Assoc., 556 N.Y.S.2d 859, 863 (App. Div.
1990) (holding that in derivative suit, the futility of demanding that the general partner sue
itself was self evident); Allison Publ'g., 602 N.Y.S.2d at 858-59 ; Rivera Cong. Assocs. v.
Yassky, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 392 (App. Div. 1966) (stating that in derivative suit, common
sense principle that if the claim is that the general partners are themselves the wrongdoers,
they obviously won't sue themselves); Curran v. LeRoux, Jr., 157 BR. 500, 506 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1993) (stating that general partner was alleged wrongdoer); Larson v. First Interstate
Bank of Kalispell, 786 P. 2d 1176, 1181 (Mont. 1990) (finding general partner a party to
wrongdoing, therefore futile to request action in derivative claim); Wolcott v. Ginsburg, 746
F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating dominant shareholder of general partner accused
of wrongdoing is antagonistic); Dean, 1999 W.L. 413400, at *3 (holding that where
derivative suit is against the person who solely owns the general partner, demand is
excused). Compare Carson, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1260 (excusing demand where LLC
managers are controlled by one member who is accused of oppressing minority member).
153See supra note 59 (discussing idea that bringing direct suit does not interfere with
operation of entity).
154See, e.g., Orsi v. Sunshine Art Studios, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 471, 475 (D. Mass. 1995).
The official comments [to section 7.01(d)] note that the rules for a derivative claim
were 'essentially intended to protect public corporations against strike suits.' Id. §
7.0 1(d) cmt. Here, there is no likelihood of such suits-[sister suing her two brothers

60

THE JOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 7:19

As is summarized in the next section, these authorities suggest that almost
all breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by an LLC member or limited
partner against those in control of the business may be properly pursued as a
direct, and not as a derivative, claim.
IV. CONCLUSION: MOST CLAIMS MAY BE BROUGHT DIRECTLY AND
NOT DERIVATIVELY
In bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim against those in control, the
member or partner will often find the court tempted to apply a test-improperly
imported from the corporate world-which prejudices the court toward
requiring the suit to be brought derivatively with all the concomitant problems.
Without considering whether the derivative procedures are necessary to resolve
the matter, the court may simply state that the breach of fiduciary duty has
caused an injury directly to the LLC, which only indirectly diminishes the
value of the member's interest. Therefore, a derivative claim is proper.
However, applying a more critical analysis, many opinions discussed1 in
55
this Article have correctly concluded that a direct suit is more appropriate.
These opinions have considered various factors in arriving at the decision that
the action should be brought directly. Some have noted that if all the interested
members are joined, then the action is proper because the LLC (or partnership)
is really nothing more than the aggregate of the interests of those already
joined. Some have noted that the reasons derivative procedures are needed are
not present, therefore, a direct action for breach of duty does not interfere with
the legitimate management of the business. Sometimes the analysis is no more
complicated than the conclusion that a breach of a direct duty mandates a direct
recovery. Particularly important, a number of opinions have recognized that
any theft of assets from the LLC, any usurpation of a business opportunity, or
any similar wrongful behavior reduces the member's capital account-a very
"direct" injury to the member. In some instances, an applicable statute grants
the plaintiff standing to bring a direct claim. A direct action for an accounting
or dissolution of the LLC or partnership, likewise, may not require joinder of
the entity.
If we look to the reasons why the derivative procedures have been used in
other contexts, these reasons are simply not applicable in most breach of
fiduciary duty claims against those in charge-nor can they be more
appropriately met by applying the ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE section 7.0 1(d). 56 The following four reasons have been cited as

alleging squeeze out, payment of personal benefits to brothers, usurpation of corporate
opportunities and other wrongs].
Id.; Brown v. Brown, 731 A.2d 1212, 1217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), ("Finally, this
case does not present as a 'strike suit,' one of the dangers the derivative suit standing rules
have been designed to combat.").
155 See supra sections II.A. 1-2.
156 2
A.L.I.,
PRINCIPLES
OF
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.01 (d) (1994).
In the case of a closely held corporation, the court in its discretion may treat an action
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reasons that a derivative suit should be pursued: (1) avoiding multitudinous
litigation, (2) protecting the creditors of the business, (3) protecting the
interests of all the owners, and (4) adequately compensating the injured owners
by increasing the value of their interests when recovery is put back into the
business. 157
ALl section 7.01(d) responds to each of these concerns. It, in essence,
requires that the plaintiff properly plead three elements: (1) that she has joined
all of the partners or members who have an interest in pursuing the claim (those
aligned with the defendant or having effectively waived their claims do not
need to be joined);1 58 (2) that there either are no creditors who need protection
or the other assets of the LLC are sufficient to protect them (or that they are
otherwise protected); (3) that under the terms of the operating agreement and
statute, the remedy sought properly compensates the plaintiff for her specific
loss. Assuming that the plaintiff in her direct suit pleads (and ultimately
establishes) these requirements, she has demonstrated that the four basic
reasons behind requiring a derivative suit have been met. As such, the court
should have no qualms in permitting the suit to go forward as a direct claim.
Derivative procedures have also been deemed important as a method to
give management a way to resolve disputes and as a protection from "strike
suits." A breach of fiduciary claim brought in the context of a closely held
business simply does not raise a realistic possibility for the claim to be resolved
internally. The filing of the suit demonstrates that this is almost always futile.
The threat of strike suits in the context of a closely held business likewise
simply is not a realistic risk, or it is a risk which must take a back seat to the
rights of those who may have been injured. If the plaintiff has been able to
establish the three requirements of section 7.01(d) mentioned in the prior
paragraph, there is very little likelihood that these two additional considerations
will be present-and could be a reason why the plaintiff must proceed
derivatively.
In essence, in most breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by an LLC
member (or limited partner) against the manager, general partner, or others in
control, both common law authority and the principles established by the
American Law Institute recommend that the plaintiff be permitted to pursue her
claim directly.

raising derivative claims as a direct action, exempt it from those restrictions and
defenses applicable only to derivative actions, and order an individual recovery, if it
finds that to do so will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a
multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the
corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested
persons.

Id.
Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, 561 (Ind. 1995).
1S See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 19(c) ("Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading
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asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as
described in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are
not joined.").

